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Short	 Abstract:	 Neuroimaging	 research	 has	 predominantly	 drawn	 conclusions	 based	 on	 classical	
statistics.	 Recently,	 statistical	 learning	methods	 enjoy	 increasing	 popularity.	 These	methodological	
families	used	for	neuroimaging	data	analysis	can	be	viewed	as	two	extremes	of	a	continuum,	but	are	
based	on	different	histories,	theories,	assumptions,	and	outcome	metrics;	thus	permitting	different	
conclusions.	 This	 paper	 portrays	 commonalities	 and	 differences	 between	 classical	 statistics	 and	
statistical	learning	with	regard	to	neuroimaging	research.	The	conceptual	implications	are	illustrated	
in	 three	 case	 studies.	 It	 is	 thus	 tried	 to	 resolve	 possible	 confusion	 between	 classical	 hypothesis	
testing	and	data-guided	model	estimation	by	discussing	ramifications	for	the	neuroimaging	access	to	
neurobiology.	
	
Long	 Abstract:	 Neuroimaging	 research	 has	 predominantly	 drawn	 conclusions	 based	 on	 classical	
statistics,	 including	null-hypothesis	 testing,	t-tests,	and	ANOVA.	Throughout	recent	years,	statistical	
learning	methods	 enjoy	 increasing	 popularity,	 including	 cross-validation,	 pattern	 classification,	 and	
sparsity-inducing	regression.	These	two	methodological	families	used	for	neuroimaging	data	analysis	
can	 be	 viewed	 as	 two	 extremes	 of	 a	 continuum.	 Yet,	 they	 originated	 from	 different	 historical	
contexts,	 build	 on	 different	 theories,	 rest	 on	 different	 assumptions,	 evaluate	 different	 outcome	
metrics,	 and	 permit	 different	 conclusions.	 This	 paper	 portrays	 commonalities	 and	 differences	
between	classical	statistics	and	statistical	learning	with	their	relation	to	neuroimaging	research.	The	
conceptual	implications	are	illustrated	in	three	common	analysis	scenarios.	It	is	thus	tried	to	resolve	
possible	 confusion	 between	 classical	 hypothesis	 testing	 and	 data-guided	 model	 estimation	 by	
discussing	their	ramifications	for	the	neuroimaging	access	to	neurobiology.	
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recognition,	p-value,	prediction	
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Main	Text	
"The	trick	to	being	a	scientist	is	to	be	open	to	using	a	wide	variety	of	tools."	
Leo	Breiman	(2001)	
	
1.	Introduction	
Among	 the	 greatest	 challenges	 humans	 face	 are	 cultural	 misunderstandings	 between	 individuals,	
groups,	 and	 institutions	 (Hall,	 1989).	 The	 topic	 of	 the	 present	 paper	 is	 the	 culture	 clash	 between	
statistical	inference	by	null-hypothesis	rejection	and	out-of-sample	generalization	(L.	Breiman,	2001;	
Friedman,	 1998;	 Shmueli,	 2010)	 that	 are	 increasingly	 combined	 in	 the	 brain-imaging	 domain	 (N.	
Kriegeskorte,	 Simmons,	 Bellgowan,	 &	 Baker,	 2009).	 Ensuing	 inter-cultural	 misunderstandings	 are	
unfortunate,	 because	 the	 invention	 and	 application	 of	 new	 research	 methods	 has	 always	 been	 a	
driving	force	in	the	neurosciences	(Deisseroth,	2015;	Greenwald,	2012;	Yuste,	2015).	It	is	the	goal	of	
the	present	paper	to	disentangle	classical	inference	and	generalization	inference	by	juxtaposing	their	
historical	trajectories	(section	2),	modelling	philosophies	(section	3),	conceptual	frameworks	(section	
4),	and	performance	metrics	(section	5).	
During	the	past	15	years,	neuroscientists	have	transitioned	from	exclusively	qualitative	reports	of	few	
patients	with	neurological	brain	lesions	to	quantitative	lesion-symptom	mapping	on	the	voxel	level	in	
hundreds	of	patients	(Bates	et	al.,	2003).	We	have	gone	from	manually	staining	and	microscopically	
inspecting	 single	 brain	 slices	 to	 3D	 models	 of	 neuroanatomy	 at	 micrometer	 scale	 (Amunts	 et	 al.,	
2013).	 We	 have	 also	 gone	 from	 individual	 experimental	 studies	 to	 the	 increasing	 possibility	 of	
automatized	knowledge	aggregation	across	 thousands	of	previously	 isolated	neuroimaging	 findings	
(T.	 Yarkoni,	 Poldrack,	 Nichols,	 Van	 Essen,	 &	Wager,	 2011).	 Rather	 than	 laboriously	 collecting	 and	
publishing	 in-house	data	 in	a	 single	paper,	 investigators	are	now	routinely	 reanalyzing	multi-modal	
data	 repositories	 managed	 by	 national,	 continental,	 and	 inter-continental	 consortia	 (Kandel,	
Markram,	Matthews,	Yuste,	&	Koch,	2013;	Henry	Markram,	2012;	Poldrack	&	Gorgolewski,	2014;	Van	
Essen	et	al.,	2012).	The	granularity	of	neuroimaging	datasets	 is	hence	growing	in	terms	of	scanning	
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resolution,	 sample	 size,	 and	 complexity	 of	 meta-information	 (S.	 Eickhoff,	 Turner,	 Nichols,	 &	 Van	
Horn,	 2016;	 Van	 Horn	 &	 Toga,	 2014).	 As	 an	 important	 consequence,	 the	 scope	 of	 neuroimaging	
analyses	 has	 expanded	 from	 the	 predominance	 of	 null-hypothesis	 testing	 to	 statistical-learning	
methods	 that	 are	 i)	more	 data-driven	 by	 flexible	models,	 ii)	 naturally	 scalable	 to	 high-dimensional	
data,	 and	 iii)	 more	 heuristic	 by	 increased	 reliance	 on	 numerical	 optimization	 (Jordan	 &	 Mitchell,	
2015;	 LeCun,	Bengio,	&	Hinton,	2015).	Statistical	 learning	 (T.	Hastie,	 Tibshirani,	&	Friedman,	2001)	
henceforth	 comprises	 the	 umbrella	 of	 "machine	 learning",	 "data	 mining",	 "pattern	 recognition",	
"knowledge	discovery",	and	"high-dimensional	statistics".	
In	fact,	the	very	notion	of	statistical	inference	may	be	subject	to	expansion.	The	following	definition	is	
drawn	 from	a	 committee	 report	 to	 the	National	 Academies	 of	 the	USA	 (Jordan	 et	 al.,	 2013,	 p.	 8):	
"Inference	 is	 the	 problem	of	 turning	 data	 into	 knowledge,	where	 knowledge	often	 is	 expressed	 in	
terms	of	variables	 [...]	 that	are	not	present	 in	 the	data	per	 se,	but	are	present	 in	models	 that	one	
uses	 to	 interpret	 the	 data."	 According	 to	 this	 authoritative	 definition,	 statistical	 inference	 can	 be	
understood	 as	 encompassing	 not	 only	 classical	 null-hypothesis	 falsification	 but	 also	 out-of-sample	
generalization	 (cf.	 Jacob	 Cohen,	 1990;	 G.	 Gigerenzer	 &	 Murray,	 1987).	 Classical	 statistics	 and	
statistical	 learning	might	give	rise	 to	different	categories	of	 inference,	which	remains	an	 inherently	
difficult	 concept	 to	 define	 (Chamberlin,	 1890;	 Pearl,	 2009;	 Platt,	 1964).	 Any	 choice	 of	 statistical	
method	 for	 a	 neurobiological	 investigation	 predetermines	 the	 spectrum	 of	 possible	 results	 and	
permissible	conclusions.	
Briefly	 taking	 an	 epistemological	 perspective,	 a	 new	 scientific	 fact	 is	 probably	 not	 established	 in	
vacuo	(Fleck,	Schäfer,	&	Schnelle,	1935;	 italic	terms	 in	this	passage	taken	from	source).	Rather,	the	
object	 is	 recognized	 and	 accepted	 by	 the	 subject	 according	 to	 socially	 conditioned	 thought	 styles	
cultivated	 among	 members	 of	 thought	 collectives.	 A	 witnessed	 and	 measured	 neurobiological	
phenomenon	tends	 to	only	become	"true"	 if	not	at	odds	with	 the	constructed	 thought	history	and	
closed	 opinion	 system	 shared	 by	 that	 subject.	 In	 the	 following,	 two	 such	 thought	 milieus	 will	 be	
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revisited	 and	 reintegrated	 in	 the	 context	 of	 imaging	 neuroscience:	 classical	 statistics	 (CS)	 and	
statistical	learning	(SL).	
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2.	Different	histories	
2.1	The	origins	of	classical	hypothesis	testing	and	learning	algorithms	
The	 largely	 independent	historical	 trajectories	of	 the	 two	statistical	 families	are	even	evident	 from	
their	most	basic	terminology.	Inputs	to	statistical	models	are	usually	called	independent	variables	or	
predictors	in	the	CS	literature,	but	are	called	features	collected	in	a	feature	space	in	the	SL	literature.	
The	outputs	are	called	dependent	variables	or	responses	in	CS	and	target	variables	in	SL,	respectively.	
	
Around	 1900	 the	 notions	 of	 standard	 deviation,	 goodness	 of	 fit,	 and	 the	 "p	 <	 0.05"-threshold	
emerged	(Cowles	&	Davis,	1982).	This	was	also	the	period	when	William	S.	Gosset	published	the	t-
test	 under	 the	 incognito	 name	 "Student"	 to	 quantify	 production	 quality	 in	 Guinness	 breweries.	
Motivated	 by	 concrete	 problems	 such	 as	 the	 interaction	 between	 potato	 varieties	 and	 fertilizers,	
Ronald	 A.	 Fisher	 invented	 the	 analysis	 of	 variance	 (ANOVA),	 null-hypothesis	 testing,	 promoted	 p	
values,	and	devised	principles	of	proper	experimental	conduct	(R.	A.	Fisher,	1925;	Ronald	A.	Fisher,	
1935;	 Ronald	 A.	 Fisher	 &	Mackenzie,	 1923).	 An	 alternative	 framework	 for	 hypothesis	 testing	 was	
proposed	by	Jerzy	Neyman	and	Egon	S.	Pearson,	which	 introduced	the	statistical	notions	of	power,	
false	positives	and	false	negatives,	but	 left	out	the	concept	of	p	values	(Neyman	&	Pearson,	1933).	
This	was	 a	 time	when	 controlled	 experiments	were	 preferentially	 performed	on	 single	 individuals,	
before	 the	 gradual	 transition	 to	 participant	 groups	 in	 the	 30s	 and	 40s,	 and	 before	 electrical	
calculators	emerged	after	World	War	II	(Efron	&	Tibshirani,	1991;	Gerd	Gigerenzer,	1993).	Student's	
t-test	 and	 Fisher's	 inference	 framework	 were	 institutionalized	 by	 American	 psychology	 textbooks	
that	were	widely	read	in	the	40s	and	50s.	Neyman	and	Pearson's	approach	only	became	increasingly	
known	 in	 the	 50s	 and	 60s.	 This	 led	 authors	 of	 social	 science	 textbooks	 to	 promote	 a	 somewhat	
incoherent	mixture	of	 the	Fisher	and	Neyman-Pearson	approaches	 to	statistical	 inference,	 typically	
without	explicit	mention.	It	is	this	conglomerate	of	classical	frameworks	to	performing	inference	that	
today's	textbooks	of	applied	statistics	have	inherited	(Bortz,	2006;	Moore	&	McCabe,	1989).	
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It	is	a	topic	of	current	debate1,2,3	whether	CS	is	a	discipline	that	is	separate	from	SL	(e.g.,	L.	Breiman,	
2001;	Chambers,	1993;	Friedman,	2001)	or	if	statistics	is	a	broader	class	that	includes	CS	and	SL	as	its	
members	 (e.g.,	Cleveland,	2001;	 Jordan	&	Mitchell,	2015;	Tukey,	1962).	SL	methods	are	 frequently	
adopted	 by	 computer	 scientists,	 physicists,	 engineers,	 and	 others	 who	 have	 no	 formal	 statistical	
background	 and	 are	 typically	 working	 in	 industry	 rather	 than	 academia.	 In	 fact,	 John	 W.	 Tukey	
foresaw	 many	 of	 the	 developments	 that	 led	 up	 to	 what	 one	 might	 today	 call	 statistical	 learning	
(Tukey,	 1962,	 1965).	He	 proposed	 a	 “peaceful	 collision	 of	 computing	 and	 statistics”	 as	well	 as	 the	
distinction	 into	 "exploratory"	 and	 "confirmatory"	 data	 analysis4.	 This	 emphasized	 data-driven	
analysis	techniques	as	a	toolbox	useful	in	a	large	variety	of	real-world	settings	to	gain	an	intuition	of	
the	 data	 properties.	 Kernel	 methods,	 neural	 networks,	 decision	 trees,	 nearest	 neighbors,	 and	
graphical	models	all	actually	originated	in	the	CS	community,	but	mostly	continued	to	develop	in	the	
SL	community	(Friedman,	2001).	As	often	cited	beginnings	of	self-learning	algorithms,	the	perceptron	
was	 an	 early	 brain-inspired	 computing	 algorithm	 (Rosenblatt,	 1958),	 and	 Arthur	 Samuel	 created	 a	
checker	board	program	 that	 succeeded	 in	beating	 its	own	creator	 (Samuel,	1959).	 Such	 studies	on	
artificial	 intelligence	 (AI)	 led	 to	 enthusiastic	 optimism	 and	 subsequent	 disappointment	 due	 to	 the	
slow	progress	of	 learning	algorithms.	The	consequence	was	a	 slow-down	of	 research,	 funding,	and	
interest	during	the	so-called	"AI	winters"	in	the	late	70s	and	around	the	90s	(D.	D.	Cox	&	Dean,	2014;	
Kurzweil,	 2005;	 Russell	 &	 Norvig,	 2002),	 while	 the	 increasingly	 available	 computers	 in	 the	 80s	
encouraged	a	new	wave	of	statistical	algorithms	(Efron	&	Tibshirani,	1991).	The	difficult-to-train	but	
back	then	widely	used	neural	network	algorithms	were	superseded	by	support	vector	machines	with	
																																								 																				
1	"Data	Science	and	Statistics:	different	worlds?"	(Panel	at	Royal	Statistical	Society	UK,	March	2015)	
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C1zMUjHOLr4)	
	
2	"50	years	of	Data	Science"	(David	Donoho,	Tukey	Centennial	workshop,	USA,	Sept.	2015)	
3	"Are	ML	and	Statistics	Complementary?"	(Max	Welling,	6th	IMS-ISBA	meeting,	December	2015)	
4	As	a	very	recent	reformulation	of	the	same	idea:	"If	the	inference/algorithm	race	is	a	tortoise-and-hare	affair,	
then	modern	electronic	computation	has	bred	a	bionic	hare."	(Efron	&	Hastie,	2016)		
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convincing	 out-of-the-box	 performances	 (Cortes	 &	 Vapnik,	 1995).	 Later,	 the	 use	 of	 SL	 methods	
increased	 steadily	 in	 many	 quantitative	 scientific	 domains	 as	 they	 underwent	 an	 increase	 in	
information	granularity	from	classical	"long	data"	(samples	n	>	variables	p)	to	modern	"wide	data"	(n	
<	 p)	 (Tibshirani,	 1996).	 The	 emerging	 field	 of	 SL	 has	 been	much	 conceptually	 consolidated	 by	 the	
seminal	 book	 "The	 Elements	 of	 Statistical	 Learning"	 (T.	 Hastie	 et	 al.,	 2001).	 The	 coincidence	 of	
changing	 data	 properties,	 increasing	 computational	 power,	 and	 cheaper	 memory	 resources	
encouraged	a	resurge	in	SL	research	and	applications	approximately	since	2000	(House	of	Common,	
2016;	Manyika	et	al.,	2011).	Over	the	last	15	years,	sparsity	assumptions	gained	increasing	relevance	
for	 statistical	 tractability	 and	 domain	 interpretability	 when	 using	 supervised	 and	 unsupervised	
learning	algorithms	 (i.e.,	with	and	without	 target	variables)	by	 imposing	a	prior	distribution	on	 the	
model	 parameters	 (Bach,	 Jenatton,	Mairal,	&	Obozinski,	 2012).	 According	 to	 the	 "bet	 on	 sparsity"	
(Trevor	Hastie,	Tibshirani,	&	Wainwright,	2015),	only	a	subset	of	the	features	should	be	expected	to	
be	 relevant	 because	 no	 existing	 statistical	 method	 performs	 well	 in	 the	 dense	 high-dimensional	
scenario	that	assumes	all	features	to	be	relevant	in	the	"true"	model	(Brodersen,	Haiss,	et	al.,	2011;	
T.	 Hastie	 et	 al.,	 2001).	 	 This	 enabled	 reproducible	 and	 interpretable	 statistical	 relationships	 in	 the	
high-dimensional	"n	<<	p"	regime	(Bühlmann	&	Van	De	Geer,	2011;	Trevor	Hastie	et	al.,	2015).	More	
recently,	improvements	in	training	very	"deep"	(i.e.,	many	non-linear	hidden	layers)	neural	networks	
architectures	(Geoffrey	E.	Hinton	&	Salakhutdinov,	2006)	have	much	improved	automatized	feature	
selection	 (Bengio,	 Courville,	 &	 Vincent,	 2013)	 and	 have	 exceeded	 human-level	 performance	 in	
several	 tasks	 (LeCun	et	 al.,	 2015).	 For	 instance,	 one	 recent	 deep	 reinforcement	 learning	 algorithm	
mastered	playing	49	different	computer	games	based	on	simple	pixel	input	alone	(Mnih	et	al.,	2015).	
Today,	systematic	education	in	SL	is	still	rare	at	most	universities,	in	contrast	to	the	omnipresence	of	
CS	courses	(Burnham	&	Anderson,	2014;	Cleveland,	2001;	Donoho,	2015;	Vanderplas,	2013).	
	
2.2	Related	spotlights	in	the	history	of	neuroimaging	analysis	methods	
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For	more	 than	a	 century,	 neuroscientific	 conclusions	were	mainly	 drawn	 from	brain	 lesion	 reports	
(Broca,	 1865;	 Harlow,	 1848;	 Wernicke,	 1881),	 microscopical	 inspection	 (Brodmann,	 1909;	 Vogt	 &	
Vogt,	 1919),	 brain	 stimulation	 during	 surgery	 (Penfield	 &	 Perot,	 1963),	 and	 pharmacological	
intervention	 (Clark,	 Del	 Giudice,	 &	 Aghajanian,	 1970),	 often	 without	 strong	 reliance	 on	 statistical	
methodology.	The	advent	of	more	readily	quantifiable	neuroimaging	methods	(Fox	&	Raichle,	1986)	
then	 allowed	 for	 in-vivo	 characterization	 of	 the	 neural	 correlates	 underlying	 sensory,	 cognitive,	 or	
affective	tasks.	Ever	since,	topographical	 localization	of	neural	activity	 increases	and	decreases	was	
dominated	by	analysis	approaches	from	CS,	especially	the	general	linear	model	(GLM;	dates	back	to	
Nelder	&	Wedderburn,	1972).	Although	the	GLM	is	well	known	not	to	correspond	to	neurobiological	
reality,	it	has	provided	good	and	interpretable	approximations.	It	was	and	still	 is	routinely	used	in	a	
mass-univariate	regime	that	computes	simultaneous	univariate	statistics	for	each	independent	voxel	
observation	of	brain	scans	(Friston	et	al.,	1994).	It	involves	fitting	beta	coefficients	corresponding	to	
the	columns	of	a	design	matrix	(i.e.,	prespecified	stimulus/task/behavior	indicators,	the	independent	
variables)	to	a	single	voxel's	imaging	time	series	of	measured	neural	activity	changes	(i.e.,	dependent	
variable)	to	obtain	a	beta	coefficient	for	each	indicator.	It	is	seldom	mentioned	that	the	GLM	would	
not	have	been	solvable	for	unique	solutions	in	the	high-dimensional	regime	because	the	number	of	
input	 variables	 p	 exceeded	 by	 far	 the	 number	 of	 samples	 n	 (i.e.,	 under-determined	 system	 of	
equations),	which	 incapacitates	many	statistical	estimators	from	CS	(cf.	Giraud,	2014;	Trevor	Hastie	
et	 al.,	 2015).	 Regularization	 by	 sparsity-inducing	 norms,	 such	 as	 in	modern	 regression	 analysis	 via	
Lasso	and	ElasticNet	(cf.	Trevor	Hastie	et	al.,	2015;	Jenatton,	Audibert,	&	Bach,	2011),	emerged	only	
later	 as	 a	 principled	 way	 to	 de-escalate	 the	 need	 for	 dimensionality	 reduction	 and	 to	 enable	 the	
tractability	 of	 the	 high-dimensional	 "p	 >	 n"	 case	 (Tibshirani,	 1996).	 Many	 software	 packages	 for	
neuroimaging	 analysis	 consequently	 implemented	 discrete	 voxel-wise	 analyses	 with	 classical	
inference.	 The	 ensuing	 multiple	 comparisons	 problem	 motivated	 more	 than	 two	 decades	 of	
methodological	 research	 (Friston,	 2006;	 Thomas	E.	Nichols,	 2012;	 Stephen	M.	 Smith,	Matthews,	&	
Jezzard,	 2001;	 Worsley,	 Evans,	 Marrett,	 &	 Neelin,	 1992).	 It	 was	 initially	 addressed	 by	 reporting	
uncorrected	(Vul,	Harris,	Winkielman,	&	Pashler,	2008)	or	Bonferroni-corrected	findings	(Thomas	E.	
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Nichols,	 2012),	 then	 increasingly	 by	 false	 discovery	 rate	 (Genovese,	 Lazar,	 &	 Nichols,	 2002)	 and	
cluster-level	tresholding	(Stephen	M.	Smith	&	Nichols,	2009).	Further,	it	was	early	acknowledged	that	
the	unit	of	interest	should	be	spatially	neighboring	voxel	groups	and	that	the	null	hypothesis	needed	
to	 account	 for	 all	 voxels	 exhibiting	 some	 signal	 (Chumbley	&	 Friston,	 2009).	 These	 concerns	were	
addressed	by	inference	in	 locally	smooth	neighborhoods	based	on	random	field	theory	that	models	
discrete	voxel	activations	as	topological	units	with	continuous	activation	height	and	extent	(Worsley	
et	al.,	1992).	That	is,	the	spatial	dependencies	of	voxel	observations	were	not	incorporated	into	the	
GLM	 estimation	 step,	 but	 instead	 during	 the	 subsequent	 model	 inference	 step	 to	 alleviate	 the	
multiple	comparisons	problem.	
	
To	 abandon	 the	 voxel-independence	 assumption	 of	 the	 mass-univariate	 GLM,	 SL	 models	 were	
proposed	early	on	 for	neuroimaging	 investigations.	 For	 instance,	principal	 component	analysis	was	
used	to	distinguish	 local	and	global	neural	activity	changes	(Moeller,	Strother,	Sidtis,	&	Rottenberg,	
1987)	as	well	as	to	study	Alzheimer's	disease	(Grady	et	al.,	1990),	while	canonical	correlation	analysis	
yielded	 complex	 relationships	 between	 task-free	 neural	 activity	 and	 schizophrenia	 symptoms	
(Friston,	Liddle,	Frith,	Hirsch,	&	Frackowiak,	1992).	Note	that	these	first	approaches	to	"multivariate"	
brain-behavior	associations	did	not	 ignite	a	major	 research	 trend	 (cf.	 Friston	et	al.,	 2008;	Worsley,	
Poline,	Friston,	&	Evans,	1997).	Supervised	classification	estimators	were	also	used	in	early	structural	
neuroimaging	 analyses	 (Herndon,	 Lancaster,	 Toga,	 &	 Fox,	 1996)	 and	 they	 improved	 preprocessing	
performance	for	volumetric	neuroimaging	data	(Ashburner	&	Friston,	2005).	However,	the	popularity	
of	 SL	 methods	 only	 peaked	 after	 being	 rebranded	 as	 "mind-reading",	 "brain	 decoding",	 and	
"multivariate	 pattern	 analysis"	 that	 appealed	 by	 identifying	 ongoing	 thought	 from	 neural	 activity	
alone	(J.	D.	Haynes	&	Rees,	2005;	Kamitani	&	Tong,	2005).	Up	to	that	point,	the	term	prediction	had	
less	often	been	used	in	the	concurrent	sense	of	out-of-sample	generalization	of	a	learning	model	and	
more	 often	 in	 the	 incompatible	 sense	 of	 in-sample	 linear	 correlation	 between	 (time-free	 or	 time-
shifted)	data	(Gabrieli,	Ghosh,	&	Whitfield-Gabrieli,	2015;	Shmueli,	2010).	The	"searchlight"	approach	
	 11	
for	 "pattern-information	 analysis"	 subsequently	 enabled	 whole-brain	 assessment	 of	 local	
neighborhoods	 of	 predictive	 patterns	 of	 neural	 activity	 fluctuations	 (N.	 Kriegeskorte,	 Goebel,	 &	
Bandettini,	 2006).	 The	 position	 of	 such	 "decoding"	 models	 within	 the	 branches	 of	 statistics	 has	
seldom	been	made	explicit	(but	see	Friston	et	al.,	2008).	The	growing	interest	was	manifested	in	first	
review	and	tutorial	papers	that	were	published	on	applying	SL	methods	to	neuroimaging	data	(J.	D.	
Haynes	&	Rees,	2006;	Mur,	Bandettini,	&	Kriegeskorte,	2009;	Pereira,	Mitchell,	&	Botvinick,	2009).	
The	 conceptual	 appeal	 of	 this	 new	 access	 to	 the	 neural	 correlates	 of	 cognition	 and	 behavior	was	
flanked	 by	 availability	 of	 the	 necessary	 computing	 power	 and	memory	 resources.	 This	 was	 also	 a	
precondition	for	regularization	by	structured	sparsity	penalties	(Wainwright,	2014)	that	 incorporate	
neurobiological	 priors	 as	 local	 spatial	 dependence	 (Gramfort,	 Thirion,	&	 Varoquaux,	 2013;	Michel,	
Gramfort,	Varoquaux,	Eger,	&	Thirion,	2011)	or	spatial-temporal	dependence	(Gramfort,	Strohmeier,	
Haueisen,	 Hamalainen,	 &	 Kowalski,	 2011).	 Although	 challenging,	 "deep"	 neural	 networks	 have	
recently	 been	 introduced	 to	 neuroimaging	 (de	 Brebisson	 &	Montana,	 2015;	 Güçlü	 &	 van	 Gerven,	
2015;	 Plis	 et	 al.,	 2014).	 The	 application	 of	 these	 "deep"	 statistical	 architectures	 occurs	 in	 an	
atheoretical,	 more	 empirically	 justified	 setting	 as	 their	 mathematical	 properties	 are	 incompletely	
understood	and	many	formal	guarantees	are	missing	(but	see	Bach,	2014).	Nevertheless,	they	might	
help	 in	 deciphering	 and	 approximating	 the	 nature	 of	 neural	 processing	 in	 the	 brain	 (D.	 D.	 Cox	 &	
Dean,	2014;	Yamins	&	DiCarlo,	2016).	This	agenda	appears	closely	related	to	David	Marr's	distinction	
of	 information	 processing	 into	 computational	 (~what?),	 algorithmic-representational	 (~how?),	 and	
implementational-physical	(~where?)	levels	(Marr,	1982).	Last	but	not	least,	there	is	an	always	bigger	
interest	 in	 and	 pressure	 for	 data	 sharing,	 open	 access,	 and	 building	 "big-data"	 repositories	 in	
neuroscience	(Devor	et	al.,	2013;	Gorgolewski	et	al.,	2014;	Kandel	et	al.,	2013;	Henry	Markram,	2012;	
Poldrack	 &	 Gorgolewski,	 2014;	 Van	 Essen	 et	 al.,	 2012).	 As	 the	 dimensionality	 and	 complexity	 of	
neuroimaging	 datasets	 increases,	 neuroscientific	 investigations	 will	 probably	 benefit	 increasingly	
from	SL	methods	and	their	variants	adapted	to	the	data-intense	regime	(e.g.,	Engemann	&	Gramfort,	
2015;	Kleiner,	Talwalkar,	Sarkar,	&	Jordan,	2012;	Zou,	Hastie,	&	Tibshirani,	2006).	While	 larger	data	
quantities	allow	detection	of	more	subtle	effects,	false	positive	findings	are	likely	to	become	a	major	
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issue	 as	 they	 unavoidably	 arise	 from	 statistical	 estimation	 in	 the	 high-dimensional	 data	 scenario	
(Jordan	et	al.,	2013;	Meehl,	1967).	
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3.	Different	philosophies	
3.1	Two	different	modelling	goals	in	statistical	methods	
One	 of	 the	 possible	 ways	 to	 catalogue	 statistical	 methods	 is	 by	 framing	 them	 along	 the	 lines	 of	
classical	statistics	and	statistical	learning.	Statistical	methods	can	thus	be	conceptualized	as	spanning	
a	continuum	between	the	two	poles	of	CS	and	SL	(Jordan	et	al.,	2013;	p.	61).	While	some	statistical	
methods	cannot	easily	be	categorized	by	this	distinction,	the	two	families	of	statistical	methods	can	
generally	be	distinguished	by	a	number	of	representative	properties.	
	
As	 the	 precise	 relationship	 between	 CS	 and	 SL	 has	 seldom	 been	 explicitly	 characterized	 in	
mathematical	 terms,	 the	 author	must	 resort	 to	more	 descriptive	 explanations	 (see	 already	 Efron,	
1978).	 One	 of	 the	 key	 differences	 becomes	 apparent	 when	 thinking	 of	 the	 neurobiological	
phenomenon	under	study	as	a	black	box	(L.	Breiman,	2001).	CS	typically	aims	at	modelling	the	black	
box	 by	making	 a	 set	 of	 accurate	 assumptions	 about	 its	 content,	 such	 as	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 signal	
distribution.	 Gaussian	 distributional	 assumptions	 have	 been	 very	 useful	 in	 many	 instances	 to	
enhance	 mathematical	 convenience	 and,	 hence,	 computational	 tractability.	 SL	 typically	 aims	 at	
finding	 any	 way	 to	 model	 the	 output	 of	 the	 black	 box	 from	 its	 input	 while	 making	 the	 least	
assumptions	possible	(Abu-Mostafa,	Magdon-Ismail,	&	Lin,	2012).	In	CS	the	stochastic	processes	that	
generated	the	data	is	therefore	treated	as	partly	known,	whereas	in	SL	the	phenomenon	is	treated	as	
complex,	 largely	unknown,	and	partly	unknowable.	 In	this	sense,	CS	tends	to	be	more	analytical	by	
imposing	mathematical	rigor	on	the	phenomenon,	whereas	SL	tends	to	be	more	heuristic	by	finding	
useful	approximations	to	the	phenomenon.	CS	specifies	the	properties	of	a	given	statistical	model	at	
the	 beginning	 of	 the	 investigation,	 whereas	 in	 SL	 there	 is	 a	 bigger	 emphasis	 on	 models	 whose	
parameters	 and	 at	 times	 even	 structures	 (e.g.,	 learning	 algorithms	 creating	 decision	 trees)	 are	
generated	during	 the	statistical	estimation.	The	SL-minded	 investigator	may	 favor	simple,	 tractable	
models	even	when	making	conscious	false	assumptions	(Domingos,	2012)	because	sufficiently	 large	
data	 quantities	 are	 expected	 to	 remedy	 them	 (Devroye,	 Györfi,	 &	 Lugosi,	 1996;	 Halevy,	 Norvig,	 &	
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Pereira,	2009).	A	new	function	with	potentially	thousands	of	parameters	is	created	that	can	predict	
the	 output	 from	 the	 input	 alone,	 without	 explicit	 programming	 model.	 This	 requires	 the	 input	
features	to	represent	different	variants	of	all	relevant	configurations	of	the	examined	phenomenon	
in	 nature.	 In	 CS	 the	 mathematical	 assumptions	 are	 typically	 stated	 explicitly,	 while	 SL	 models	
frequently	 have	 implicit	 assumptions	 that	 may	 be	 less	 openly	 discussed.	 Intuitively,	 the	 truth	 is	
believed	 to	 be	 in	 the	 model	 (cf.	 Wigner,	 1960)	 in	 a	 CS-constrained	 statistical	 regime,	 while	 it	 is	
believed	to	be	in	the	data	(cf.	Halevy	et	al.,	2009)	in	a	SL-constrained	statistical	regime.	Also	differing	
in	their	output,	CS	typically	yields	point	and	interval	estimates	 (e.g.,	p	values,	variances,	confidence	
intervals),	 whereas	 SL	 frequently	 outputs	 functions	 (e.g.,	 the	 k-means	 centroids	 or	 a	 trained	
classifier's	decision	 function	can	be	applied	to	new	data).	As	another	 tendency,	SL	 revolves	around	
solving	and	introducing	prior	knowledge	into	iterative	numerical	optimization	problems.	CS	methods	
are	more	often	closed-form	one-shot	computations	without	any	successive	approximation	process,	
although	 several	 models	 are	 also	 fitted	 numerically	 by	 maximum	 likelihood	 estimation	 (Boyd	 &	
Vandenberghe,	2004;	Jordan	et	al.,	2013).	
In	 more	 formal	 terms,	 CS	 relates	 closely	 to	 statistics	 for	 confirmatory	 data	 analysis,	 whereas	 SL	
relates	more	to	statistics	for	exploratory	data	analysis	(Tukey,	1962).	In	practice,	CS	is	probably	more	
often	applied	to	experimental	data,	where	a	set	of	target	variables	are	systematically	controlled	by	
the	investigator	and	the	system	under	studied	has	been	subject	to	structured	perturbation.	Instead,	
SL	is	perhaps	more	typically	applied	to	observational	data	without	such	structured	influence	and	the	
studied	system	has	been	left	unperturbed	(Domingos,	2012).	From	yet	another	important	angle,	one	
should	 not	 conflate	 so-called	 explanatory	 modelling	 and	 predictive	 modelling	 (Shmueli,	 2010).	 CS	
mainly	 performs	 retrospective	 explanatory	 modelling	 by	 emphasis	 on	 the	 operationalization	 of	
preselected	 hypothetical	 constructs	 as	measurable	 outcomes	 using	 frequently	 linear,	 interpretable	
models.	 SL	 mainly	 performs	 prospective	 predictive	 modelling	 and	 quantifies	 the	 generalization	 to	
future	observations	with	or	without	formal	incorporation	of	hypothetical	concepts	into	models	that	
are	more	 frequently	 non-linear	 with	 challenging	 to	 impossible	 interpretability.	 There	 is	 the	 often-
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overlooked	 misconception	 that	 models	 with	 high	 explanatory	 power	 do	 necessarily	 exhibit	 high	
predictive	 power	 (Lo,	 Chernoff,	 Zheng,	 &	 Lo,	 2015;	 Wu,	 Chen,	 Hastie,	 Sobel,	 &	 Lange,	 2009).	 An	
important	 outcome	 measure	 in	 CS	 is	 the	 quantified	 significance	 associated	 with	 a	 statistical	
relationship	between	few	variables	given	a	pre-specified	model.	The	outcome	measure	for	SL	is	the	
quantified	generalizability	or	robustness	of	patterns	between	many	variables	or,	more	generally,	the	
robustness	of	 special	 structure	 in	 the	data	 (T.	Hastie	et	al.,	2001).	CS	 tends	 to	 test	 for	a	particular	
structure	 in	 the	data	based	on	analytical	guarantees,	 such	as	mathematical	 convergence	 theorems	
about	 approximating	 the	 population	 properties	 with	 increasing	 sample	 size.	 Instead,	 SL	 tends	 to	
explore	 particular	 structure	 in	 the	 data	 and	 quantify	 its	 generalization	 to	 new	 data	 certified	 by	
empirical	guarantees,	such	as	by	explicit	evaluation	of	the	predictiveness	of	a	fitted	model	to	unseen	
data	 (Efron	&	 Tibshirani,	 1991).	 CS	 thus	 resorts	more	 to	what	 Leo	 Breiman	 called	data	modelling,	
imposing	an	a-priori	model	in	a	top-down	fashion,	while	SL	would	be	algorithmic	modelling,	fitting	a	
model	as	a	function	of	the	data	at	hand	in	a	bottom-up	fashion	(L.	Breiman,	2001).	
Although	 this	 polarization	 of	 statistical	methodology	may	 be	 oversimplified,	 it	 serves	 as	 a	 didactic	
tool	 to	confront	 two	different	perspectives.	Taken	together,	CS	was	mostly	 fashioned	for	problems	
with	 small	 samples	 that	 can	 be	 grasped	 by	 plausible	 models	 with	 a	 small	 number	 of	 parameters	
chosen	by	the	investigator	in	an	analytical	fashion.	SL	was	mostly	fashioned	for	problems	with	many	
variables	 in	potentially	 large	 samples	with	 rare	 knowledge	of	 the	data-generating	process	 that	 are	
emulated	by	a	mathematical	 function	created	 from	data	by	a	machine	 in	a	heuristic	 fashion.	Tests	
from	CS	therefore	typically	assume	that	the	data	behave	according	to	known	mechanisms,	whereas	
SL	exploits	algorithmic	techniques	to	avoid	a-priori	specifications	of	data	mechanism.	In	this	way,	CS	
preassumes	and	tests	a	model	for	the	data,	whereas	SL	learns	a	model	from	the	data	5.	
	
																																								 																				
5	"Indeed,	the	trend	since	Pearl’s	work	in	the	1980’s	has	been	to	blend	reasoning	and	learning:	put	simply,	one	
does	not	need	to	learn	(from	data)	what	one	can	infer	(from	the	current	model).	Moreover,	one	does	not	need	
to	infer	what	one	can	learn	(intractable	inferential	procedures	can	be	circumvented	by	collecting	data)."	
(Jordan,	2010)	
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Obviously,	the	existing	repertoire	of	statistical	methods	could	have	been	dissected	in	different	ways.	
For	instance,	the	Bayesian-frequentist	distinction	is	orthogonal	to	the	CS-SL	distinction	(Efron,	2005;	
Freedman,	1995;	Z.	Ghahramani,	2015).	Bayesian	statistics	can	be	viewed	as	subjective	and	optimistic	
in	 considering	 the	 data	 at	 hand	 conditioned	 on	 preselected	 distributional	 assumptions	 for	 the	
probabilistic	model	 to	 perform	 direct	 inference	 (Wagenmakers,	 Lee,	 Lodewyckx,	&	 Iverson,	 2008).	
Frequentist	statistics	are	more	objective	and	pessimistic	in	considering	a	distribution	of	possible	data	
with	unknown	model	parameters	to	perform	indirect	inference	by	the	differences	between	observed	
and	model-derived	data.	It	is	important	to	appreciate	that	Bayesian	statistics	can	be	adopted	in	both	
CS	and	SL	families	in	various	flavors	(Friston	et	al.,	2008;	Geoffrey	E.	Hinton,	Osindero,	&	Teh,	2006;	
Kingma	&	Welling,	 2013).	 Furthermore,	CS	and	SL	 approaches	 can	hardly	be	 clearly	 categorized	as	
either	 discriminative	 or	generative	 (Bishop,	 2006;	 G.E.	 Hinton,	 Dayan,	 Frey,	 &	 Neal,	 1995;	 Jordan,	
1995;	Ng	&	Jordan,	2002).	Discriminative	models	focus	on	solving	a	supervised	problem	of	predicting	
a	 class	 y	 by	 directly	 estimating	 P(y|X)	 without	 capturing	 special	 structure	 in	 the	 data	 X.	 Typically	
more	demanding	in	data	quantity	and	computational	resources,	generative	models	estimate	special	
structure	by	P(y|X)	from	P(X|y)	and	P(y)	and	can	thus	produce	synthetical	examples	X~	for	each	class	
y.	Further,	CS	and	SL	cannot	be	disambiguated	into	deterministic	versus	probabilistic	models	(Shafer,	
1992).	 Statistical	 models	 are	 often	 not	 exclusively	 deterministic	 because	 they	 incorporate	 a	
component	 that	accounts	 for	unexpected,	noisy	variation	 in	 the	data.	Each	probabilistic	model	can	
also	 be	 viewed	 as	 a	 superclass	 of	 a	 deterministic	 model	 (Norvig,	 2011).	 Neither	 can	 the	 terms	
univariate	 and	multivariate	 be	 exclusively	 grouped	 into	 either	 CS	 or	 SL.	 They	 traditionally	 denote	
reliance	 on	 one	 versus	 several	 dependent	 variables	 (CS)	 or	 target	 variables	 (SL)	 in	 the	 statistical	
literatures.	 In	 the	 neuroimaging	 literature,	 "multivariate"	 however	 frequently	 refers	 to	 high-
dimensional	 approaches	 operating	 on	 the	 neural	 activity	 from	 all	 voxels	 in	 opposition	 to	 mass-
univariate	approaches	operating	on	single	voxel	activity	(Brodersen,	Haiss,	et	al.,	2011;	Friston	et	al.,	
2008).	CS	can	be	divided	into	uni-	and	multivariate	groups	of	statistical	tests	(Ashburner	&	Kloppel,	
2011;	 Friston	 et	 al.,	 2008),	 while	 SL	 is	 largely	 focused	 on	 higher-dimensional	 problems	 that	 often	
naturally	 transform	 to	 the	 multivariate	 classification/regression	 setting.	 Tapping	 on	 yet	 another	
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terminology,	 CS	 methods	 may	 be	 argued	 to	 be	 closer	 to	 parametric	 statistics	 by	 instantiating	
statistical	 models	 whose	 number	 of	 parameters	 is	 fixed,	 finite,	 and	 not	 a	 function	 of	 sample	 size	
(Bishop,	 2006;	 Z.	 Ghahramani,	 2015).	 Instead,	 SL	 methods	 are	 more	 often	 (but	 not	 exclusively)	
realized	in	a	non-parametric	setting	by	instantiating	flexible	models	whose	parameters	grow	increase	
explicitly	or	implicitly	with	more	input	data.	Parametric	approaches	are	often	more	successful	if	few	
observations	are	available.	Conversely,	non-parametric	approaches	may	be	more	naturally	prepared	
to	capture	emergence	properties	that	only	occur	from	larger	datasets	(Z.	Ghahramani,	2015;	Halevy	
et	al.,	2009;	 Jordan	et	al.,	2013).	For	 instance,	a	non-parametric	 (but	not	parametric)	 classifier	 can	
extract	ever	more	complex	decision	boundaries	from	increasing	training	data	(e.g.,	decision	tress	and	
nearest	neighbors).	Most	importantly,	neither	CS	nor	SL	can	generally	be	considered	superior.	This	is	
captured	 by	 the	 no	 free	 lunch	 theorem6	 (Wolpert,	 1996),	 which	 states	 that	 no	 single	 statistical	
strategy	can	consistently	do	better	in	all	circumstances	(cf.	Gerd	Gigerenzer,	2004).	The	investigator	
has	 the	 discretion	 to	 choose	 which	 statistical	 approach	 best	 suited	 to	 the	 neurobiological	
phenomenon	under	study	and	the	neuroscientific	research	object	at	hand.	
	
3.2	Different	modelling	goals	in	neuroimaging	
Statistical	analysis	grounded	 in	CS	and	SL	 is	more	closely	 related	 to	encoding	models	and	decoding	
models	 in	 the	 neuroimaging	 domain,	 respectively	 (Nikolaus	 Kriegeskorte,	 2011;	 T.	 Naselaris,	 Kay,	
Nishimoto,	&	Gallant,	2011;	Pedregosa,	Eickenberg,	Ciuciu,	Thirion,	&	Gramfort,	2015;	but	see	Güçlü	
et	 al,	 2015).	 Encoding	 models	 regress	 the	 data	 against	 a	 design	 matrix	 with	 potentially	 many	
explanatory	columns	of	stimulus	(e.g.,	face	versus	house	pictures),	task	(e.g.,	to	evalute	or	to	attend),	
or	behavioral	 (e.g.,	age	or	gender)	 indicators	by	 fitting	general	 linear	models.	 In	contrast,	decoding	
models	typically	predict	these	indicators	by	training	and	testing	classification	algorithms	on	different	
																																								 																				
6	In	the	supervised	setting,	there	is	no	a	priori	distinction	between	learning	algorithms	evaluated	by	out-of-
sample	prediction	error.	In	the	optimization	setting	of	finite	spaces,	all	algorithms	searching	an	extremum	
perform	identical	when	averaged	across	possible	cost	functions.	(http://www.no-free-lunch.org/)	
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splits	from	the	whole	dataset.	In	CS	parlance,	the	encoding	model	fits	the	neural	activity	data	by	the	
beta	coefficients,	the	dependent	variables,	according	to	the	indicators	in	the	design	matrix	columns,	
the	independent	variables.	An	explanation	for	decoding	models	in	SL	jargon	would	be	that	the	model	
weights	of	a	classifier	are	fitted	on	the	training	set	of	the	 input	data	to	predict	the	class	 labels,	the	
target	variables,	 and	are	subsequently	evaluated	on	 the	 test	 set	by	cross-validation	 to	obtain	 their	
out-of-sample	 generalization	 performance.	 Put	 differently,	 a	 GLM	 fits	 coefficients	 of	
stimulus/task/behavior	 indicators	on	neural	activity	data	for	each	voxel	separately	given	the	design	
matrix	 (T.	 Naselaris	 et	 al.,	 2011).	 Classifiers	 predict	 entries	 of	 the	 design	 matrix	 for	 all	 voxels	
simultaneously	 given	 the	 neural	 activity	 data	 (Pereira	 et	 al.,	 2009).	 A	 key	 difference	 between	 CS-
mediated	 encoding	 models	 and	 SL-mediated	 decoding	 models	 thus	 pertains	 to	 the	 direction	 of	
inference	between	brain	space	and	indicator	space	(Friston	et	al.,	2008;	Varoquaux	&	Thirion,	2014).	
The	mapping	 direction	 hence	 pertains	 to	 the	 question	whether	 the	 indicators	 in	 the	model	 act	 as	
causes	by	representing	deterministic	experimental	variables	of	an	encoding	model	or	consequences	
by	representing	probabilistic	outputs	of	a	decoding	model	(Friston	et	al.,	2008).	These	considerations	
also	reveal	the	intimate	relationship	of	CS	models	to	the	notion	of	so-called	forward	inference,	while	
SL	methods	are	probably	more	often	used	for	formal	reverse	inference	in	functional	neuroimaging	(S.	
B.	Eickhoff	et	al.,	2011;	Poldrack,	2006;	Varoquaux	&	Thirion,	2014;	T.	Yarkoni	et	al.,	2011).	On	the	
one	 hand,	 forward	 inference	 relates	 to	 encoding	 models	 by	 testing	 the	 probability	 of	 observing	
activity	 in	 a	 brain	 location	 given	 knowledge	 of	 a	 psychological	 process.	 Reverse	 inference,	 on	 the	
other	hand,	 relates	 to	brain	 "decoding"	by	 testing	 the	probability	of	 a	psychological	 process	being	
present	 given	 knowledge	 of	 activation	 in	 a	 brain	 location.	 Finally,	 establishing	 a	 brain-behavior	
association	has	been	argued	to	be	more	important	than	the	actual	direction	of	the	mapping	function.	
This	 is	because	"showing	that	one	can	decode	activity	in	the	visual	cortex	to	classify	[...]	a	subject’s	
percept	 is	 exactly	 the	 same	 as	 demonstrating	 significant	 visual	 cortex	 responses	 to	 perceptual	
changes"	 and,	 conversely,	 "all	 demonstrations	 of	 functionally	 specialized	 responses	 represent	 an	
implicit	mindreading"	(Friston,	2009).	
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More	specifically,	GLM	encoding	models	follow	a	representational	agenda	by	testing	hypotheses	on	
regional	effects	of	functional	specialization	in	the	brain	(where?).	A	t-test	is	used	to	compare	pairs	of	
measures	to	statistically	distinguish	one	target	and	one	non-target	set	of	mental	operations	(Friston	
et	 al.,	 1996).	 Essentially,	 this	 formal	 tests	 for	 significant	 differences	 between	 the	 beta	 coefficients	
corresponding	 to	 two	 stimulus/task	 indicators	 based	 on	 well-founded	 arguments	 from	 cognitive	
theory	 (the	 SL	 analog	would	 be	 a	 binary	 classifier	 distinguishing	 two	 class	 labels).	 It	 assumes	 that	
cognitive	subtraction	 is	possible,	 that	 is,	 the	regional	brain	responses	of	 interest	can	be	 isolated	by	
constrasting	two	sets	of	brain	scans	that	precisely	differ	in	the	cognitive	facet	of	interest	(Friston	et	
al.,	1996;	Stark	&	Squire,	2001).	For	one	voxel	location	at	a	time,	an	attempt	is	made	to	reject	the	null	
hypothesis	 of	 no	 difference	 between	 the	 averaged	 neural	 activity	 of	 a	 target	 brain	 state	 and	 the	
averaged	neural	activity	of	a	control	brain	state.	Note	that	establishing	a	brain-behavior	association	
via	 GLM	 is	 therefore	 a	 judgment	 about	 neural	 activity	 compressed	 in	 the	 time	 dimension.	 The	
univariate	GLM	analysis	can	be	easily	extended	to	more	than	one	output	(dependent)	variable	within	
the	CS	regime	by	performing	a	multivariate	analysis	of	covariance	(MANCOVA).	This	allows	for	tests	
of	more	complex	hypotheses	but	 incurs	multivariate	normality	assumptions	 (Nikolaus	Kriegeskorte,	
2011).	 Conceptually,	 one	 can	 switch	 the	 direction	 of	 inference	 by	 reframing	 the	 estimated	 beta	
coefficients	 as	 independent	 variables	 and	 the	 stimulus/task/behavior	 indicator	 as	 the	 response	
variable	to	perform	multiple	linear	regression	(ANCOVA)	(Brodersen,	Haiss,	et	al.,	2011;	T.	Naselaris	
et	 al.,	 2011).	 The	 beta	 coefficients	 would	 then	 play	 an	 analogous	 role	 to	 the	model	 weights	 of	 a	
trained	 classification	 algorithm.	 Finally,	 the	often-performed	 small	 volume	 correction	 (an	 analog	 in	
the	SL	world	would	be	classification	after	 feature	selection)	corresponds	to	simultaneously	 fitting	a	
GLM	to	each	voxel	of	a	restricted	region	of	interest.	
Because	hypothesis	testing	for	significant	differences	between	beta	coefficients	of	fitted	GLMs	relies	
on	averaged	neural	activity,	the	test	results	are	not	corrupted	by	the	conventionally	applied	spatial	
smoothing	 with	 a	 Gaussian	 filter.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 this	 even	 helps	 the	 correction	 for	 multiple	
comparisons	based	on	 random	 fields	 theory,	 alleviates	 inter-individual	 neuroanatomical	 variability,	
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and	 thus	 increases	 sensitivity.	 Spatial	 smoothing	 however	 discards	 fine-grained	 spatial	 activity	
patterns	that	carry	potential	information	about	mental	operations	(J.-D.	Haynes,	2015).	Indeed,	some	
authors	 believe	 that	 sensory,	 cognitive,	 and	 motor	 processes	 manifest	 themselves	 as	 neuronal	
population	codes	(Averbeck,	Latham,	&	Pouget,	2006).	Relevance	of	such	population	codes	in	human	
neuroimaging	was	 for	 instance	 suggested	by	 revealing	 subject-specific	 fusiform-gyrus	 responses	 to	
facial	 stimuli	 (Saygin	 et	 al.,	 2012).	 In	 applications	 of	 SL	 models,	 the	 spatial	 smoothing	 step	 is	
therefore	 often	 skipped	 because	 the	 "decoding"	 algorithms	 precisely	 exploit	 this	 multivariate	
structure	of	the	salt-and-pepper	patterns.	
In	 contrast,	 decoding	 models	 use	 learning	 algorithms	 for	 an	 informational	 agenda	 by	 showing	
generalization	 of	 robust	 patterns	 to	 new	 brain	 activity	 acquisitions	 (de-Wit,	 Alexander,	 Ekroll,	 &	
Wagemans,	2016;	N.	Kriegeskorte	et	al.,	2006;	Mur	et	al.,	2009).	Information	that	is	locally	weak	but	
spatially	 distributed	 can	 be	 effectively	 harvested	 in	 a	 structure-preserving	 fashion	 (J.	 D.	 Haynes	&	
Rees,	 2006).	 Some	 brain-behavior	 associations	might	 only	 emerge	 when	 simultaneously	 capturing	
neural	activity	in	a	group	of	voxels	but	disappear	in	single-voxel	approaches,	such	as	GLMs.	However,	
analogous	 to	multivariate	 variants	 of	 the	GLM,	 “decoding”	 can	 also	be	done	by	means	of	 classical	
statistical	approaches.	Essentially,	 inference	on	 information	patterns	 in	 the	brain	reduces	 to	model	
comparison	 (Friston,	 2009).	 During	 training	 of	 a	 classifier	 to	 predict	 indicators	 correctly,	 an	
optimization	 algorithm	 (e.g.,	 gradient	 descent	 or	 its	 variants)	 searches	 iteratively	 through	 the	
hypothesis	space	(=	function	space)	of	the	chosen	learning	model.	Each	such	hypothesis	corresponds	
to	 one	 specific	 combination	 of	model	 weights	 that	 equates	with	 one	 candidate	mapping	 function	
from	the	neural	activity	features	to	the	indicators.	In	this	way,	four	types	of	neuroscientific	questions	
have	been	proposed	 to	become	quantifiable	 (Brodersen,	2009;	Pereira	et	al.,	2009):	 i)	Where	 is	an	
information	category	neurally	processed?	This	extends	the	 interpretational	spectrum	from	increase	
and	 decrease	 of	 neural	 activity	 to	 the	 existence	 of	 complex	 combinations	 of	 activity	 variations	
distributed	across	voxels.	For	 instance,	 linear	classifiers	decoded	object	categories	from	the	ventral	
temporal	cortex,	even	after	excluding	the	fusiform	gyrus,	which	is	known	to	be	responsive	to	object	
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stimuli	(Haxby	et	al.,	2001).	 ii)	Whether	a	given	information	category	is	reflected	by	neural	activity?	
This	extends	the	interpretational	spectrum	to	topographically	similar	but	neurally	distinct	processes	
that	 potentially	 underlie	 different	 cognitive	 facets.	 For	 instance,	 linear	 classifiers	 successfully	
whether	 a	 subject	 is	 attending	 to	 the	 first	 or	 second	 of	 two	 simultaneously	 presented	 gratings	
(Kamitani	&	Tong,	2005).	iii)	When	is	an	information	category	generated	(i.e.,	onset),	processed	(i.e.,	
duration),	 and	 bound	 (i.e.,	 alteration)?	 When	 applying	 classifiers	 to	 neural	 time	 series,	 the	
interpretational	spectrum	can	be	extended	to	the	beginning,	evolution,	and	end	of	distinct	cognitive	
facets.	 For	 instance,	 different	 classifiers	 have	 been	 demonstrated	 to	 map	 the	 decodability	 time	
structure	of	mental	operation	sequences	(King	&	Dehaene,	2014).	iv)	More	controversially,	how	is	an	
information	 category	 neurally	 processed?	 The	 interpretational	 spectrum	 is	 extended	 to	
computational	 properties	 of	 the	 neural	 processes,	 including	 processing	 in	 brain	 regions	 versus	
networks	 or	 isolated	 versus	 partially	 shared	processing	 facets.	 For	 instance,	 a	 classifier	 trained	 for	
evolutionarily	 conserved	 eye	 gaze	 processes	 was	 able	 to	 decode	 evolutionarily	 more	 recent	
mathematical	calculation	processes	as	a	possible	case	of	neural	recycling	in	the	human	brain	(Knops,	
Thirion,	Hubbard,	Michel,	&	Dehaene,	2009).	As	an	 important	caveat,	the	particular	properties	of	a	
chosen	learning	algorithm	(e.g.,	 linear	versus	non-linear	support	vector	machines)	can	probably	not	
serve	as	a	convincing	argument	for	reverse-engineering	neural	processing	mechanisms	(Misaki,	Kim,	
Bandettini,	&	Kriegeskorte,	2010).	However,	many	prediction	problems	in	neuroscience	can	probably	
be	solved	without	exhaustive	neurobiological	micro-,	meso-,	or	macro-level	knowledge	(H.	Markram,	
2006;	Sandberg	&	Bostrom,	2008).	
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4.	Different	theories	
4.1	Diverging	ways	to	formalize	statistical	inference	
Besides	diverging	historical	origins	and	modelling	goals,	CS	and	SL	rely	on	largely	distinct	theoretical	
frameworks	 that	 revolve	around	null-hypothesis	 testing	and	statistical	 learning	 theory.	CS	probably	
laid	 down	 its	 most	 important	 theoretical	 framework	 in	 the	 Popperian	 spirit	 of	 critical	 empiricism	
(Popper,	 1935/2005):	 scientific	 progress	 is	 to	 be	 made	 by	 continuous	 replacement	 of	 current	
hypotheses	 by	 ever	 more	 pertinent	 hypotheses	 using	 verification	 and	 falsification.	 The	 rationale	
behind	 hypothesis	 falsification	 is	 that	 one	 counterexample	 can	 reject	 a	 theory	 by	 deductive	
reasoning,	 while	 any	 quantity	 of	 evidence	 cannot	 confirm	 a	 given	 theory	 by	 inductive	 reasoning	
(Goodman,	 1999).	 The	 investigator	 verbalizes	 two	 mutually	 exclusive	 hypotheses	 by	 domain-
informed	judgment.	The	alternative	hypothesis	should	be	conceived	so	as	to	contradict	the	state	of	
the	 art	 of	 the	 research	 topic.	 The	 null	 hypothesis	 should	 automatically	 deduce	 from	 the	 newly	
articulated	alternative	hypothesis.	 The	 investigator	has	 the	agenda	 to	disprove	 the	null	 hypothesis	
because	 it	 only	 leaves	 the	 preferred	 alternative	 hypothesis	 as	 the	 new	 standard	 belief.	 A	
conventional	 5%-threshold	 (i.e.,	 equating	 with	 roughly	 two	 standard	 deviations)	 guards	 against	
rejection	 due	 to	 the	 idiosyncrasies	 of	 the	 sample	 that	 are	 not	 representative	 of	 the	 general	
population.	If	the	data	have	a	probability	of	<=5%	to	be	true	given	the	null	hypothesis	(P(result|H0)),	
it	is	evaluated	to	be	significant.	Such	a	test	for	statistical	significance	indicates	a	difference	between	
two	means	with	 a	 5%	 chance	 after	 sampling	 twice	 from	 the	 same	population.	 There	 are	 common	
misconceptions	 that	 it	 denotes	 the	 probability	 of	 the	 null	 hypothesis	 (P(H0)),	 the	 alternative	
hypothesis	 (P(H1)),	 the	result	of	 the	 test	statistic	 (P(result)),	or	 the	null	hypothesis	given	the	result	
(P(H0|result))	(Markus,	2001;	Pollard	&	Richardson,	1987).	If	the	null	hypothesis	is	not	rejected,	then	
nothing	can	be	concluded	about	the	whole	significance	test	according	to	most	statisticians.	That	 is,	
the	 test	 yields	 no	 conclusive	 result,	 rather	 than	 a	 null	 result	 (Schmidt,	 1996).	 In	 this	way,	 classical	
hypothesis	 testing	continuously	 replaces	currently	embraced	hypotheses	explaining	a	phenomenon	
in	nature	by	better	hypotheses	with	more	empirical	support	 in	a	Darwinian	selection	process.	Note	
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however	 that	 corroborating	substantive	hypotheses	 (e.g.,	 a	 specific	 linguistic	 theory	 like	Chomsky's	
Universal	Grammar)	requires	more	than	statistical	hypothesis	testing	(Chow,	1998;	Friedman,	1998;	
Meehl,	 1978).	 A	 statistical	 hypothesis	 can	 be	 properly	 tested	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 substantive	
hypothesis	 of	 the	 phenomenon	 under	 study	 (Oakes,	 1986).	 Finally,	 Fisher,	 Neyman,	 and	 Pearson	
intended	 hypothesis	 testing	 as	 a	 marker	 for	 further	 investigation,	 rather	 than	 an	 off-the-shelf	
decision-making	instrument	(J.	Cohen,	1994;	Nuzzo,	2014).	
A	theoretical	framework	relevant	to	both	CS	and	SL,	is	the	bias-variance	tradeoff.	It	is	a	stand-alone	
concept	that	 is	helpful	to	consider	 in	theory	and	practice	by	providing	a	different	angle	on	deriving	
conclusions	 from	 data	 (e.g.,	 Geman,	 Bienenstock,	 &	 Doursat,	 1992).	 As	 famously	 noted7,	 any	
statistical	 model	 is	 an	 over-simplification	 of	 the	 studied	 phenomenon,	 a	 distortion	 of	 the	 truth.	
Choosing	the	"right"	statistical	model	hence	pertains	to	the	right	balance	between	bias	and	variance.	
Bias	 denotes	 the	difference	between	 the	 target	 function	 (i.e.,	 the	 "true"	 relationship	between	 the	
data	and	a	response	variable	that	the	investigator	is	trying	to	uncover	from	the	data)	and	the	average	
of	the	function	space	(or	hypothesis	space)	instantiated	by	a	model.	Intuitively,	the	bias	describes	the	
rigidity	of	the	model-derived	functions.	High-bias	models	yield	virtually	the	same	best	approximating	
function,	 even	 for	 larger	 perturbations	 of	 the	 data.	Variance	 denotes	 the	 difference	 between	 the	
best	approximating	function	among	members	of	the	function	space	and	the	average	of	the	function	
space.	 Intuitively,	variance	describes	 the	differences	between	the	 functions	derived	 from	the	same	
model	 family.	High-variance	models	yield	very	different	best	approximating	function	even	for	small	
perturbations	of	 the	data.	 In	 sum,	bias	 tends	 to	decrease	and	variance	 tends	 to	 increase	as	model	
complexity	 increases.	 Simple	 models	 exhibit	 high	 bias	 and	 low	 variance.	 They	 lead	 to	 a	 bad	
approximation	 as	 they	 do	 not	 well	 simulate	 the	 target	 function,	 a	 behavior	 of	 the	 studied	
phenomenon.	Yet,	they	exhibit	a	good	generalization	in	successfully	extrapolating	from	seen	data	to	
unseen	 data.	 Contrarily,	 complex	 models	 exhibit	 low	 bias	 and	 high	 variance.	 They	 have	 a	 better	
chance	of	well	approximating	the	target	function	at	the	price	of	generalizing	 less	well	to	new	data.	
																																								 																				
7	"All	models	are	wrong;	some	models	are	useful."	(George	Box)	
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That	 is	 because	 complex	models	 tend	 to	 fit	 too	well	 the	 data	 to	 the	 point	 of	 fitting	 noise.	 This	 is	
called	overfitting	 and	 occurs	when	model	 fitting	 integrates	 information	 independent	 of	 the	 target	
function	 and	 idiosyncratic	 to	 the	 data	 sample.	 The	 bias-variance	 decomposition	 captures	 this	
fundamental	 tradeoff	 in	 statistical	 modelling	 between	 approximating	 the	 behavior	 of	 the	 studied	
phenomenon	 and	 generalizing	 to	 new	 data	 describing	 that	 behavior.	 If	 the	 target	 function	 was	
known,	 the	 bias-variance	 tradeoff	 could	 be	 computed	 explicitly,	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	 inability	 of	
computing	 the	 Vapnik-Chervonenkis	 dimensions	 (VC	 dimensions)	 of	 non-trivial	 models	 (cf.	 next	
passage).	 The	 bias-variance	 tradeoff	 can	 also	 practically	 explain	 why	 successful	 applications	 of	
statistical	models	largely	rely	on	i)	the	amount	of	available	data,	ii)	the	typically	not	known	amount	of	
noise	in	the	data,	and	iii)	the	unknown	complexity	of	the	target	function	(Abu-Mostafa	et	al.,	2012).	
While	the	concept	of	bias-variance	tradeoff	 is	highly	relevant	 in	both	abstract	theory	and	everyday	
application	 of	 CS	 and	 SL	 models	 (Bishop,	 2006;	 T.	 Hastie	 et	 al.,	 2001),	 the	 concept	 of	 Vapnik-
Chervonenkis	 dimensions	 plays	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	 statistical	 learning	 theory.	 The	 VC	 dimensions	
mathematically	 formalize	 the	 circumstances	 under	 which	 a	 pattern-learning	 algorithm	 can	
successfully	distinguish	between	points	and	extrapolate	to	new	examples	(Vapnik,	1989,	1996).	This	
comprises	 any	 instance	 of	 learning	 from	 a	 number	 of	 observations	 to	 derive	 general	 rules	 that	
capture	 properties	 of	 phenomena	 in	 nature,	 including	 human	 and	 computer	 learning	 (cf.	 Bengio,	
2014;	 Lake,	 Salakhutdinov,	&	 Tenenbaum,	 2015;	 Tenenbaum,	 Kemp,	Griffiths,	&	Goodman,	 2011).	
Note	that	this	inductive	logic	to	learn	a	general	principle	from	examples	contrasts	the	deductive	logic	
of	hypothesis	 falsification	 (cf.	 above).	VC	dimensions	provide	a	probabilistic	measure	of	whether	a	
certain	 model	 is	 able	 to	 learn	 a	 distinction	 with	 respect	 to	 a	 given	 dataset.	 Formally,	 the	 VC	
dimensions	measure	 the	 complexity	 capacity	 of	 a	 function	 space	 by	 counting	 the	 number	 of	 data	
points	that	can	be	cleanly	divided	(i.e.,	"shattered")	into	distinct	groups	as	a	result	of	the	flexibility	of	
the	function	set.	Intuitively,	the	VC	dimensions	provide	a	guideline	for	the	largest	set	of	examples	fed	
into	a	 learning	 function	such	 that	 it	 is	possible	 to	guarantee	zero	classification	errors.	They	can	be	
viewed	as	the	effective	number	of	parameters	or	the	degrees	of	freedom,	a	concept	shared	between	
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CS	 and	 SL.	 In	 this	 way,	 the	 VC	 dimensions	 formalize	 the	 circumstances	 under	 which	 a	 class	 of	
functions	is	able	to	learn	from	a	finite	amount	of	data	to	successfully	predict	a	given	phenomenon	in	
previously	 unseen	 data.	 As	 one	 of	 the	most	 important	 results	 from	 statistical	 learning	 theory,	 the	
number	of	 configurations	one	 can	obtain	 from	a	classification	algorithm	grows	polynomially,	while	
the	 error	 is	 decreasing	 exponentially	 (Wasserman,	 2013).	 Practically,	 good	 models	 have	 finite	 VC	
dimensions	 -	 fitting	with	a	sufficiently	 large	amount	of	data	yieldes	performances	that	approximate	
the	 theoretically	 expected	 performance	 in	 unseen	 data.	 Bad	models	 have	 infinite	 VC	 dimensions	 -	
regardless	 of	 the	 available	 amount	 of	 data,	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	make	 generalization	 conclusions	 on	
unseen	 data.	 In	 contrast	 to	 the	 bias-variance	 tradeoff,	 the	 VC	 dimensions	 (like	 null-hypothesis	
testing)	 are	 unrelated	 to	 the	 target	 function,	 as	 the	 "true"	 mechanisms	 underlying	 the	 studied	
phenomenon	 in	 nature.	 Yet,	 VC	 dimensions	 relate	 to	 the	models	 used	 to	 approximate	 that	 target	
function.	As	an	 interesting	 consideration,	 it	 is	possible	 that	 generalization	 from	a	 concrete	dataset	
fails	even	if	the	VC	dimensions	predict	learning	as	very	likely.	However,	such	a	dataset	is	theoretically	
unlikely	to	occur.	Although	the	VC	dimensions	are	the	best	formal	concept	to	derive	errors	bounds	in	
statistical	learning	theory	(Abu-Mostafa	et	al.,	2012),	they	can	only	be	explicitly	computed	for	simple	
models.	Hence,	investigators	are	often	restricted	to	an	approximate	bound	for	VC	dimensions,	which	
limits	their	usefulness	for	theoretical	considerations.	
	
4.2	The	impact	of	diverging	inference	categories	on	neuroimaging	analyses	
When	 looking	at	neuroimaging	research	through	the	CS	 lens,	 statistical	estimation	revolves	around	
solving	the	multiple	comparisons	problem	(Thomas	E.	Nichols,	2012;	T.E.	Nichols	&	Hayasaka,	2003).	
From	the	SL	stance,	however,	it	is	the	curse	of	dimensionality	and	overfitting	that	statistical	analyses	
need	 to	 tackle	 (Domingos,	2012;	 Friston	et	al.,	 2008).	 In	 typical	neuroimaging	 studies,	CS	methods	
typically	 test	 one	 hypothesis	many	 times	 (i.e.,	 the	 null	 hypothesis),	 whereas	 SL	methods	 typically	
search	 through	 thousands	 of	 different	 hypotheses	 in	 a	 single	 process	 (i.e.,	 walking	 through	 the	
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function	space	by	numerical	optimization).	The	high	voxel	 resolution	of	common	brain	scans	offers	
parallel	measurements	of	>100,000	brain	locations.	In	a	mass-univariate	regime,	such	as	after	fitting	
voxel-wise	GLMs,	the	same	statistical	test	is	applied	>100,000	times.	The	more	often	the	investigator	
tests	 a	 hypothesis	 of	 relevance	 for	 a	 brain	 location,	 the	more	 locations	will	 be	 falsely	 detected	 as	
relevant	(false	positive,	Type	I	error),	especially	in	the	noisy	neuroimaging	data.	The	issue	consists	in	
too	many	simultaneous	statistical	inferences.	From	a	general	perspective,	all	dimensions	in	the	data	
(i.e.,	 voxel	 variables)	 are	 implicitly	 treated	 as	 equally	 important	 and	 no	 neighborhoods	 of	 most	
expected	variation	are	statistically	exploited	(T.	Hastie	et	al.,	2001).	Hence,	the	absence	of	complexity	
restrictions	 during	 the	 statistical	 modelling	 of	 neuroimaging	 data	 takes	 a	 heavy	 toll	 at	 the	 final	
inference	step.	
This	 is	 contrasted	 by	 the	 high-dimensional	 SL	 regime,	 where	 the	 initial	 model	 choice	 by	 the	
investigator	determines	the	complexity	restrictions	to	all	data	dimensions	(i.e.,	not	single	voxels)	that	
are	 imposed	 explicitly	 or	 implicitly	 by	 the	model	 structure.	Model	 choice	 predisposes	 existing	 but	
unknown	low-dimensional	neighborhoods	in	the	full	voxel	space	to	achieve	the	prediction	task.	Here,	
the	toll	is	taken	at	the	beginning	because	there	are	so	many	different	alternative	model	choices	that	
would	impose	a	different	set	of	complexity	constraints.	For	instance,	signals	from	"brain	regions"	are	
likely	to	be	well	approximated	by	models	that	impose	discrete,	locally	constant	compartments	on	the	
data	 (e.g.,	 k-means	 or	 spatially	 constrained	Ward	 clustering).	 Tuning	model	 choice	 to	 signals	 from	
macroscopical	 "brain	networks"	 should	 impose	overlapping,	 locally	 continuous	data	 compartments	
(e.g.,	 independent	component	analysis	or	sparse	principal	component	analysis).	Knowledge	of	such	
effective	 dimensions	 in	 the	 neuroimaging	 data	 is	 a	 rare	 opportunity	 to	 simultaneously	 reduce	 the	
model	 bias	and	model	 variance,	 despite	 their	 typically	 inverse	 relationship.	 Statistical	models	 that	
overcome	 the	 curse	 of	 dimensionality	 typically	 incorporate	 an	 explicit	 or	 implicit	 metric	 for	 such	
anisotropic	neighborhoods	in	the	data	(Bach,	2014;	Bzdok,	Eickenberg,	Grisel,	Thirion,	&	Varoquaux,	
2015;	T.	Hastie	et	al.,	2001).	Viewed	from	the	bias-variance	tradeoff,	this	successfully	calibrates	the	
sweet	 spot	 between	 underfitting	 and	 overfitting.	 Viewed	 from	 statistical	 learning	 theory,	 the	 VC	
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dimensions	 can	 be	 reduced	 and	 thus	 the	 generalization	 performance	 increased.	 Applying	 a	model	
without	such	complexity	restrictions	to	high-dimensional	brain	data,	generalization	becomes	difficult	
to	impossible	because	all	directions	in	the	data	are	treated	equally	in	with	isotropic	structure.	At	the	
root	 of	 the	 problem,	 all	 data	 samples	 look	 virtually	 identical	 in	 high-dimensional	 data	 scenarios	
("curse	of	dimensionality",	Bellman,	1961).	The	learning	algorithm	will	not	be	able	to	see	through	the	
noise	 and	 will	 thus	 overfit.	 In	 fact,	 these	 considerations	 explain	 why	 the	 multiple	 comparisons	
problem	 is	 closely	 linked	 to	 encoding	 studies	 and	 overfitting	 is	 more	 closely	 related	 to	 decoding	
studies	(Friston	et	al.,	2008).	Moreover,	it	offers	explanations	as	to	why	analyzing	neural	activity	in	a	
region	 of	 interest,	 rather	 than	 the	 whole	 brain,	 simultaneously	 alleviates	 both	 the	 multiple	
comparisons	 problem	 (called	 "small	 volume	 correction"	 in	 CS	 studies)	 and	 the	 overfitting	 problem	
(called	"feature	selection"	in	SL	studies).	
Further,	some	common	invalidations	of	the	CS	and	SL	statistical	frameworks	are	conceptually	related	
(cf.	case	study	two).	An	often-raised	concern	in	neuroimaging	studies	performing	classical	inference	
is	double	dipping	 or	circular	 analysis	 (N.	 Kriegeskorte	et	 al.,	 2009).	 This	 occurs	when,	 for	 instance,	
first	correlating	a	behavioral	measure	with	brain	activity	and	then	using	the	identified	subset	of	brain	
voxels	 for	 a	 second	 correlation	 analysis	 with	 that	 same	 behavioral	 measurement	 (Lieberman,	
Berkman,	&	Wager,	2009;	Vul	et	al.,	2008).	 In	 this	 scenario,	voxels	are	submitted	 to	 two	statistical	
tests	with	the	same	goal	in	a	nested,	non-independent	fashion8.	This	corrupts	the	validity	of	the	null	
hypothesis	 on	 which	 the	 reported	 test	 results	 conditionally	 depend.	 Importantly,	 this	 case	 of	
repeating	a	same	statistical	estimation	with	 iteratively	pruned	data	selections	 (on	the	training	data	
split)	 is	a	valid	routine	in	the	SL	framework,	such	as	 in	recursive	feature	extraction	(Isabelle	Guyon,	
Weston,	 Barnhill,	 &	 Vapnik,	 2002;	 Hanson	 &	 Halchenko,	 2008).	 However,	 there	 is	 an	 analog	 to	
double-dipping	 or	 circular	 analysis	 in	 CS	methods	 applied	 to	 neuroimaging	 data:	data-snooping	 or	
peeking	in	SL	analyses	based	on	out-of-sample	generalization	(Abu-Mostafa	et	al.,	2012;	Fithian,	Sun,	
&	Taylor,	2014;	Pereira	et	al.,	2009).	This	occurs,	for	instance,	when	performing	simple	(e.g.,	mean-
																																								 																				
8	"If	you	torture	the	data	enough,	nature	will	always	confess."	(Ronald	Coase)	
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centering)	 or	 more	 involved	 (e.g.,	 k-means	 clustering)	 target-variable-dependent	 or	 -independent	
preprocessing	on	the	entire	dataset,	where	 it	should	be	applied	separately	to	the	training	sets	and	
test	 sets.	 Data-snooping	 can	 lead	 to	 optimistic	 cross-validation	 estimates	 and	 a	 trained	 learning	
algorithm	 that	 fails	 on	 fresh	 data	 drawn	 from	 the	 same	distribution.	 Rather	 than	 a	 corrupted	 null	
hypothesis,	it	is	the	error	bounds	of	the	VC	dimensions	that	are	loosened	and,	ultimately,	invalidated	
because	 information	 from	 the	 concealed	 test	 set	 influences	 model	 selection	 on	 the	 training	 set.	
Conceptually,	these	two	distinct	classes	of	statistical	errors	arising	within	the	CS	and	SL	frameworks	
have	several	common	points:	i)	Both	involve	a	form	of	information	compression	by	the	necessity	to	
draw	conclusions	on	small	data	parts	drawn	from	originally	high-dimensional	neuroimaging	data.	 ii)	
Unauthorized	prior	knowledge	happens	 to	be	 introduced	 into	 the	statistical	estimation	process.	 iii)	
Both	double	 dipping	 (CS)	 and	data	 snooping	 (SL)	 involve	 a	 form	 of	bias	 -	 biasing	 the	 estimates	 to	
systematically	deviate	from	the	population	parameter	or	 increasing	the	bias	error	term	in	the	bias-
variance	 decomposition	 (Tal	 Yarkoni	 &	 Westfall,	 2016).	 iv)	 Both	 types	 of	 faux	 pas	 in	 statistical	
conduct	can	occur	 in	very	subtle	and	unexpected	ways,	but	can	be	avoided	with	often	small	effort	
(see	 case	 study	 two).	 v)	 Invalidation	 of	 the	 null	 hypothesis	 or	 the	 VC	 bounds	 can	 yield	 overly	
optimistic	 results	 that	 may	 encourage	 unjustified	 confidence	 in	 neuroscientific	 findings	 and	
conclusions.	
Moreover,	 it	 is	 probably	 optimal	 to	 perform	 cross-validation	 with	 k	 =	 5	 or	 10	 data	 splits	 in	
neuroimaging,	 despite	 diverging	 choices	 in	 previous	 studies.	 This	 is	 because	 empirical	 simulation	
studies	 (Leo	 Breiman	 &	 Spector,	 1992;	 Kohavi,	 1995)	 have	 indicated	 that	 more	 data	 splits	 k	 (i.e.,	
bigger	 training	 set,	 smaller	 test	 set)	 can	 increase	 the	 estimate's	 variance.	 Fewer	 data	 splits	 k	 (i.e.,	
smaller	 training	 set,	 bigger	 test	 set)	 can	 increase	 the	 estimate's	 bias.	 Concretely,	 for	 a	 particular	
estimate	 issued	 by	 leave-one-out	 cross-validation	 (k	 data	 splits	 =	 n	 samples)	 the	 neuroimaging	
practioner	might	unluckily	obtain	a	"fluctuation"	far	from	the	ground-truth	value	and	there	is	often	
no	second	dataset	to	double-check.	As	a	drastic	sidenote,	neuroscientists	do	not	even	know	whether	
a	 target	 function	 exists	 in	 nature	when	 approximating	 functions	when,	 for	 instance,	 automatically	
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classifying	mental	 operations	 or	 healthy	 from	 diseased	 individual	 based	 on	 brain	 scans	 (Nesterov,	
2004;	Wolpert,	1996).	Additionally,	an	analytical	proof	(Shao,	1993)	showed	that	leave-one-out	cross-
validation	 does	 not	 provide	 a	 theoretical	 guarantee	 for	 consistent	model	 estimation.	 That	 is,	 this	
cross-validation	scheme	does	not	always	select	the	best	model	assuming	that	it	is	known.	However,	
the	neuroimaging	practitioner	is	typically	satisfied	with	model	weights	that	are	reasonably	near	to	an	
optimal	local	point	and	does	not	focus	on	reaching	the	single	global	optimal	point	as	typical	in	convex	
optimization	 (Boyd	 &	 Vandenberghe,	 2004).	 As	 an	 exception,	 leave-one	 out	 cross-validation	 may	
therefore	be	more	 justified	 in	neuroimaging	data	 scenarios	with	particularly	 few	samples,	where	a	
decent	model	fit	 is	the	primary	concern.	On	a	more	practical	note,	the	computional	 load	for	 leave-
one-out	cross-validation	with	k=n	is	often	much	higher	than	for	k-fold	cross-validation	with	k=5	or	10.	
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5.	Different	currencies	
5.1	Diverging	performance	metrics	can	quantify	the	behavior	of	statistical	models	
The	neuroscientific	 investigator	who	adopts	a	CS	culture,	 typically	 somebody	with	a	background	 in	
psychology,	biology,	or	medicine,	is	in	the	habit	of	diagnosing	statistical	investigations	by	means	of	p	
values,	effect	sizes,	confidence	 intervals,	and	statistical	power.	The	p	value	denotes	the	conditional	
probability	of	obtaining	an	equal	or	more	extreme	test	statistic	provided	that	the	null	hypothesis	H0	
is	 true	 at	 the	 prespecified	 significance	 threshold	 alpha	 (Anderson,	 Burnham,	 &	 Thompson,	 2000).	
Under	 the	 condition	 of	 sufficiently	 high	 power	 (cf.	 below),	 it	 quantifies	 the	 strength	 of	 evidence	
against	the	null	hypothesis	as	a	continuous	function	(Rosnow	&	Rosenthal,	1989).	Counterintuitively,	
it	 is	 not	 an	 immediate	 judgment	 on	 the	 alternative	 hypothesis	 H1	 preferred	 by	 the	 investigator	
(Anderson	 et	 al.,	 2000;	 J.	 Cohen,	 1994).	 Three	main	 interpretations	 for	 the	 significance	 level	 exist	
(Gerd	Gigerenzer,	 1993):	 i)	 the	 conventional	 level	 of	 significance	 specified	before	 the	 investigation	
yielding	 yes-no	 information	 (early	 Fisher),	 ii)	 the	 exact	 level	 of	 significance	 obtained	 after	 the	
investigation	yielding	continuous	information	(late	Fisher),	and	iii)	the	alpha	level	indicating	a	Type	I	
error	frequency	in	tests	after	repeated	sampling	(Neyman/Pearson).	The	former	views	the	obtained	p	
value	as	a	property	of	 the	data,	whereas	 the	 latter	views	alpha	as	a	property	of	 the	statistical	 test	
(Gerd	Gigerenzer,	1993).	P	values	do	not	qualify	the	possibility	of	replication.	It	is	another	important	
caveat	that	p	values	become	better	(i.e.,	lower)	with	increasing	sample	sizes	(Berkson,	1938).	
The	essentially	binary	p	value	is	therefore	often	complemented	by	the	continuous	effect	size.	The	p	
value	is	a	deductive	inferential	measure,	whereas	the	effect	size	is	a	descriptive	measure	that	follows	
neither	 inductive	 nor	 deductive	 reasoning.	 The	 effect	 size	 can	 be	 viewed	 as	 the	 strength	 of	 a	
statistical	 relationship,	 how	much	 H0	 deviates	 from	 H1,	 or	 the	 likely	 presence	 of	 an	 effect	 in	 the	
general	population	(Chow,	1998;	Ferguson,	2009;	Kelley	&	Preacher,	2012).	It	is	a	unit-free,	sample-
size	 independent,	 often	 standardized	 statistical	 measure	 for	 the	 importance	 of	 rejecting	 H0.	 It	
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equates	 to	 zero	 if	H0	 could	 not	 be	 rejected.	 As	 a	 tendency,	 the	 lower	 the	p	 value,	 the	 higher	 the	
effect	size	(Nickerson,	2000).	Importantly,	the	effect	size	allows	the	identification	of	marginal	effects	
that	pass	the	statistical	significance	threshold	but	are	not	practically	relevant	in	the	real	world.	As	a	
property	of	 the	 actual	 statistical	 test,	 the	 effect	 size	has	different	 names	 and	 takes	 various	 forms,	
such	as	rho	in	Pearson	correlation,	eta2	in	explained	variances,	and	Cohen's	d	in	differences	between	
group	averages.	
Additionally,	the	certainty	of	a	point	estimate	(i.e.,	the	outcome	is	a	value)	can	always	be	expressed	
by	an	 interval	estimate	(i.e.,	the	outcome	is	a	value	range)	using	confidence	intervals.	They	indicate	
with	a	chosen	probability	how	often	the	"true"	population	effect	would	be	within	the	 investigator-
specified	interval	after	many	repetitions	of	the	study	(Cumming,	2009;	Estes,	1997;	Nickerson,	2000).	
Typically,	a	95%	confidence	interval	is	spanned	around	the	range	of	values	of	a	sample	mean	statistic	
that	 includes	 the	 population	 mean	 in	 19	 out	 of	 20	 cases	 across	 all	 samples.	 The	 tighter	 the	
confidence	 interval,	 the	 smaller	 the	variance	of	 the	point	estimate	of	 the	population	parameter	 in	
each	 draw	 sample	 (keeping	 the	 sample	 size	 constant).	 The	 sometimes	 normalized	 confidence	
intervals	 can	 be	 computed	 in	 a	 variety	 of	ways.	 Their	 estimation	 is	 influenced	 by	 sample	 size	 and	
population	 variability.	 They	 can	 be	 reported	 for	 different	 statistics,	 with	 different	 percentage	
borders,	and	may	be	asymmetrical.	Note	that	confidence	intervals	can	be	used	as	a	viable	surrogate	
for	formal	tests	of	statistical	significance	in	many	scenarios	(Cumming,	2009).	
Confidence	intervals	can	be	computed	in	various	data	scenarios	and	statistical	regimes,	whereas	the	
power	 is	 only	meaningful	within	 the	 culture	 of	 formal	 hypothesis	 falsification	 (Jacob	 Cohen,	 1977,	
1992;	 Oakes,	 1986).	 The	 quality	 of	 interpretation	 for	 a	 statistically	 significant	 result	 is	 strongly	
affected	by	whether	 the	original	hypothesis	was	 tenable.	The	power	measures	 the	probability	of	a	
statistical	test	to	find	a	"true"	effect,	of	rejecting	H0	in	the	long	term,	or	how	well	a	"true"	alternative	
hypothesis	 is	correctly	accepted	assuming	the	effect	exists	in	the	population,	that	is,	P(H0	detected	
to	be	false|H1	true).	A	high	power	thus	ensures	that	statistically	significant	and	non-significant	tests	
indeed	reflect	a	property	of	the	population	(Chow,	1998).	 Intuitively,	small	confidence	intervals	are	
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an	 indicator	 of	 high	 statistical	 power.	 Type	 II	 errors	 (i.e.,	 false	 negatives,	 beta	 error)	 become	 less	
likely	with	higher	power	(=	1	-	beta	error).	Concretely,	an	underpowered	investigation	does	not	allow	
choosing	 between	 H0	 and	 H1	 at	 the	 specified	 significance	 threshold	 alpha.	 Power	 calculations	
depend	on	several	 factors,	 including	 significance	 threshold	alpha,	 the	effect	 size	 in	 the	population,	
variation	in	the	population,	sample	size	n,	and	experimental	design	(Jacob	Cohen,	1992).	Rather	than	
retrospective,	 the	 necessary	 sample	 size	 n	 for	 a	 desired	 power	 can	 be	 computed	 in	 a	 prospective	
fashion	after	specifying	an	alpha	and	a	hypothesized	effect	size.	
In	 contrast,	 diagnosis	 of	 the	 obtained	 research	 findings	 takes	 a	 different	 shape	 for	 the	 SL-
indoctrinated	neuroscientist9,	typically	somebody	with	a	background	in	computer	science,	physics,	or	
engineering.	Cross-validation	 is	 the	de	 facto	 standard	 to	obtain	an	unbiased	estimate	of	 a	model's	
capacity	 to	 generalize	 beyond	 the	 sample	 at	 hand	 (Bishop,	 2006;	 T.	 Hastie	 et	 al.,	 2001).	Model	
assessment	is	done	by	training	on	a	bigger	subset	of	the	available	data	(i.e.,	training	set	for	in-sample	
performance)	and	subsequent	application	of	the	trained	model	to	the	smaller	remaining	part	of	data	
(i.e.,	test	set	for	out-of-sample	performance),	which	is	assumed	to	share	the	same	distribution.	Cross-
validation	 thus	permutes	over	 the	 sample	 in	data	 splits	until	 the	class	 label	 (i.e.,	 categorical	 target	
variable)	 of	 each	 data	 point	 has	 been	 predicted	 once.	 This	 set	 of	model-predicted	 labels	 and	 the	
corresponding	 true	 data	 point	 labels	 can	 then	 be	 submitted	 to	 the	 quality	 measures	 accuracy,	
precision,	recall,	and	F1	score	 (Powers,	2011).	As	the	simplest	among	them,	accuracy	 is	a	summary	
statistic	 that	 captures	 the	 fraction	 of	 correct	 prediction	 instances	 among	 all	 performed	 model	
applications.	This	and	the	following	measures	are	often	computed	separately	on	the	training	set	and	
the	test	set.	Additionally,	the	measures	from	training	and	testing	can	be	expressed	by	their	 inverse	
(e.g.,	training	error	as	in-sample	error	and	test	error	as	out-of-sample	error)	because	the	positive	and	
negative	cases	are	interchangeable.	
																																								 																				
9	"It	is	also	important	to	be	particularly	careful	in	reporting	errors	and	measures	of	model	fit	in	the	high-
dimensional	setting.	We	have	seen	that	when	p	>	n,	it	is	easy	to	obtain	a	useless	model	that	has	zero	residu-	
als.	Therefore,	one	should	never	use	sum	of	squared	errors,	p-values,	R2	statistics,	or	other	traditional	measures	
of	model	fit	on	the	training	data	as	evidence	of	a	good	model	fit	in	the	high-dimensional	setting."	(James,	
Witten,	Hastie,	&	Tibshirani,	2013,	p.	247,	authors'	emphasis) 
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The	 classification	 accuracy	 (=	 1	 -	 classification	 error)	 can	 be	 further	 decomposed	 into	 class-wise	
metrics	 based	 on	 the	 so-called	 confusion	matrix,	 the	 juxtaposition	 of	 the	 true	 and	 predicted	 class	
memberships.	The	precision	(=	true	positive	/	(true	positive	+	false	positive))	measures	how	many	of	
the	 predicted	 labels	 are	 correct,	 that	 is,	 how	many	members	 predicted	 to	 belong	 to	 a	 class	 really	
belong	to	that	class.	For	 instance,	among	the	participants	predicted	to	have	depression,	how	many	
are	really	affected	by	that	disease?	On	the	other	hand,	 the	recall	 (=	 true	positive	/	 (true	positive	+	
false	negative))	measures	how	many	labels	are	correctly	predicted,	that	is,	how	many	members	of	a	
class	 were	 predicted	 to	 really	 belong	 to	 that	 class.	 Hence,	 among	 the	 participants	 affected	 by	
depression,	how	many	were	actually	detected	as	such?	Put	differently,	precision	can	be	viewed	as	a	
measure	 of	 "exactness"	 or	"quality"	 and	 recall	 as	 a	 measure	 of	 "completeness"	 or	"quantity"	
(Powers,	2011).	Neither	accuracy,	precision,	or	recall	allow	 injecting	subjective	 importance	 into	the	
evaluation	process	of	the	prediction	model.	This	disadvantage	is	alleviated	by	the	Fbeta	score,	which	is	
a	 weighted	 average	 of	 the	 precision	 and	 recall	 prediction	 scores.	 Concretely,	 the	 F1	 score	 would	
equally	weigh	precision	and	 recall	of	 class	predictions,	while	 the	F0.5	 score	puts	more	emphasis	on	
precision	and	the	F2	score	more	on	recall.	Moreover,	applications	of	recall,	precision,	and	Fbeta	scores	
have	been	noted	 to	 ignore	 the	 true	negative	cases	as	well	as	 to	be	highly	susceptible	 to	estimator	
bias	(Powers,	2011).	Needless	to	say,	no	single	measure	can	be	equally	optimal	in	all	contexts.	
Finally,	learning	curves	(Abu-Mostafa	et	al.,	2012;	Murphy,	2012)	are	an	important	diagnostic	tool	to	
evaluate	 sample	 complexity,	 that	 is,	 the	 achieved	 model	 fit	 and	 prediction	 as	 a	 function	 of	 the	
available	sample	size	n.	For	increasingly	bigger	subsets	of	the	training	set,	a	classification	algorithm	is	
trained	on	that	current	share	of	the	training	set	and	then	evaluated	for	accuracy	on	the	always-same	
test	set.	Across	subset	instances,	simple	models	display	relatively	high	in-sample	error	because	they	
cannot	 approximate	 the	 target	 function	 very	well	 (underfitting)	 but	 exhibit	 good	 generalization	 to	
unseen	data	with	 relatively	 low	out-of-sample	error.	Conversely,	 complex	models	display	 relatively	
low	 in-sample	 error	 because	 they	 adapt	 too	 well	 to	 the	 data	 (overfitting)	 with	 difficulty	 to	
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extrapolate	 to	 newly	 sampled	 data	 with	 high	 out-of-sample	 error.	 In	 both	 scenarios,	 the	 model	
effectiveness	is	more	"challenged",	the	scarcer	the	data	points	available	for	model	training.	
	
5.2	Outcome	metrics	of	statistical	models	used	in	neuroimaging	
Reports	 of	 statistical	 outcomes	 in	 the	 neuroimaging	 literature	 have	 previously	 been	 recognized	 to	
confuse	notions	from	classical	statistics	and	statistical	learning	(Friston,	2012).	On	a	general	basis,	CS	
and	 SL	 do	 not	 judge	 findings	 by	 the	 same	 aspects	 of	 evidence	 (Lo	 et	 al.,	 2015;	 Shmueli,	 2010).	 In	
neuroimaging	 papers	 based	 on	 classical	 hypothesis-driven	 inference,	 p	 values,	 and	 confidence	
intervals	are	ubiquitously	reported.	There	have	however	been	very	few	reports	of	effect	size	 in	the	
neuroimaging	 literature	 (N.	 Kriegeskorte,	 Lindquist,	Nichols,	 Poldrack,	&	Vul,	 2010).	 Effect	 sizes,	 in	
turn,	are	necessary	to	compute	power	estimates.	This	explains	the	even	rarer	occurrence	of	power	
calculations	 in	neuroimaging	 research	 (but	 see	Tal	 Yarkoni	&	Braver,	 2010).	 Effect	 sizes	have	been	
argued	to	allow	verification	 that	 in	an	optimal	experimental	design	 inference	 is	 tuned	to	big	effect	
sizes	 (Friston,	2012).	 To,	 for	 instance,	estimate	 the	p	 value	and	 the	effect	 size	 for	 local	 changes	 in	
neural	 activity	 during	 a	 psychological	 task,	 one	 would	 actually	 need	 two	 independent	 samples	 of	
these	experimental	data.	One	sample	would	be	used	to	perform	statistical	 inference	on	the	neural	
activity	change	and	one	sample	 to	obtain	unbiased	effect	 sizes.	 It	has	been	previously	emphasized	
(Friston,	2012)	that	p	values	and	effect	sizes	reflect	in-sample	estimates	in	a	retrospective	inference	
regime	(CS).	These	metrics	find	an	analogue	in	out-of-sample	estimates	issued	from	cross-validation	
in	a	prospective	prediction	regime	(SL).	In-sample	effect	sizes	are	typically	an	optimistic	estimate	of	
the	"true"	effect	size	(inflated	by	high	significance	thresholds),	whereas	out-of-sample	effect	sizes	are	
unbiased	 estimates	 of	 the	 "true"	 effect	 size.	 As	 an	 important	 consequence,	 neuroimaging	
investigators	should	refrain	from	simultaneously	computing	and	reporting	both	types	of	estimates	on	
an	identical	data	sample.	This	can	lead	to	double	dipping	(cf.	case	study	two).	
In	the	high-dimensional	scenario,	analyzing	"wide"	neuroimaging	data	in	our	case,	judging	statistical	
significance	by	p	values	 is	generally	considered	to	be	challenging	 (Bühlmann	&	Van	De	Geer,	2011;	
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see	case	studies	two	and	three).	 Instead,	classification	accuracy	on	fresh	data	 is	probably	the	most	
often-reported	 performance	 metric	 in	 neuroimaging	 studies	 using	 learning	 algorithms.	 Basing	
interpretation	on	accuracy	alone	is	however	influenced	by	the	local	characteristics	of	hemodynamic	
responses,	efficiency	of	experimental	design,	data	folding	into	train	and	test	sets,	and	differences	in	
the	 feature	 number	 p	 (J.-D.	 Haynes,	 2015).	 A	 potentially	 under-exploited	 SL	 tool	 in	 this	 context	 is	
bootstrapping.	It	enables	population-level	inference	of	unknown	distributions	independent	of	model	
complexity	 by	 repeated	 random	 draws	 from	 the	 neuroimaging	 data	 sample	 at	 hand	 (Efron,	 1979;	
Efron	&	Tibshirani,	1994).	This	opportunity	to	equip	various	point	estimates	by	an	interval	estimate	
of	 certainty	 (e.g.,	 the	 interval	 for	 the	 "true"	 accuracy	 of	 a	 classifier)	 is	 unfortunately	 seldom	
embraced	in	the	contemporary	neuroimaging	domain	(but	see	Bellec,	Rosa-Neto,	Lyttelton,	Benali,	&	
Evans,	2010;	Vogelstein	et	al.,	2014).	Besides	providing	confidence	intervals,	bootstrapping	can	also	
perform	non-parametric	null	hypothesis	testing.	This	may	be	a	rare	example	of	a	direct	connection	
between	 CS	 and	 SL	 methodology.	 Alternatively,	 binomial	 tests	 can	 be	 used	 to	 obtain	 a	 p-value	
estimate	of	 statistical	 significance	 from	accuracies	and	other	performance	scores	 (Brodersen	et	al.,	
2013;	Hanke,	Halchenko,	&	Oosterhof,	2015;	Pereira	et	al.,	2009)	 in	the	binary	classification	setting	
(for	an	example	see	Bludau	et	al.,	2015).	 It	can	reject	the	null	hypothesis	that	two	categories	occur	
equally	 often.	 A	 last	 option	 that	 is	 also	 applicable	 to	 the	multi-class	 setting	 is	 label	 permutation,	
another	non-parametric	resampling	procedure	(Golland	&	Fischl,	2003;	T.	E.	Nichols	&	Holmes,	2002).	
It	can	serve	to	reject	the	null	hypothesis	that	the	neuroimaging	data	do	not	contain	any	information	
about	the	class	labels.	
Extending	 from	 the	 setting	 of	 two	 hypotheses	 or	 yes-no	 classification	 to	 multiple	 classes	 injects	
ambiguity	into	the	interpretation	of	accuracy	scores.	Rather	than	mere	better-than-chance	findings,	
it	 becomes	 more	 important	 to	 evalute	 the	 F1,	 precision	 and	 recall	 scores	 for	 each	 class	 to	 be	
predicted	in	the	brain	scans	(e.g.,	Brodersen,	Schofield,	et	al.,	2011;	Schwartz,	Thirion,	&	Varoquaux,	
2013).	It	is	important	to	appreciate	that	the	sensitivity/specificity	metrics,	more	frequently	reported	
in	CS	communities,	and	the	precision/recall	metrics,	more	frequently	reported	in	SL	communities,	tell	
slighly	different	stories	about	identical	neuroscientific	findings.	In	fact,	sensitivity	equates	with	recall	
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(=	true	positive	/	(true	positive	+	false	negative)).	Specificity	(=	true	negative	/	(true	negative	+	false	
positive))	does	however	not	equate	with	precision	 (=true	positive	/	 (true	positive	+	 false	positive)).	
Further,	a	CS	view	on	the	SL	metrics	would	be	that	maximum	precision	corresponds	to	absent	Type	I	
errors	(i.e.,	no	false	positives),	whereas	maximum	recall	corresponds	to	absent	Type	II	errors	(i.e.,	no	
false	negatives).	Again,	Type	 I	and	 II	errors	are	related	to	the	entirety	of	datapoints	 in	a	CS	regime	
and	prediction	is	only	evaluated	on	a	test	data	split	of	the	sample	in	a	SL	regime.	In	learning	curves,	a	
big	gap	between	high	 in-sample	and	 low	out-of-sample	performance	 is	 typically	observed	 for	high-
variance	models,	such	as	neural	network	algorithms	or	random	forests.	These	performance	metrics	
from	 different	 data	 splits	 often	 converge	 for	 high-bias	 models,	 such	 as	 linear	 support	 vector	
machines	 and	 logistic	 regression.	 Moreover,	 the	 medical	 domain	 and	 social	 sciences	 usually	
aggregate	 results	 in	 ROC	 (receiver	 operating	 characteristic)	 curves	 plotting	 sensitivity	 against	
specificity	scores,	whereas	engineering	and	computer	science	domains	tend	to	report	recall-precision	
curves	instead	(Davis	&	Goadrich,	2006;	Demšar,	2006).	
Finally,	 it	 is	 often	 possible	 to	 inspect	 the	 fit	 for	 purpose	 of	 trained	 black-box	models	 (Brodersen,	
Haiss,	et	al.,	2011;	Kuhn	&	Johnson,	2013).	In	SL	this	can	take	the	form	of	evaluating	some	notion	of	
support	recovery,	that	is,	the	question	to	what	extent	the	learning	algorithms	put	probability	mass	on	
the	parts	of	 the	 feature	 space	 that	are	 "truely"	underlying	 the	given	 classes.	 In	neuroimaging,	 this	
pertains	 to	 the	 difference	 between	models	 that	 capture	 task-specific	 aspects	 of	 neural	 activity	 or	
arbitrary	 discriminative	 aspects,	 such	 as	 structured	 noise	 in	 participant-	 or	 scanner-related	
idiosyncracies	 (Brodersen,	 Haiss,	 et	 al.,	 2011;	 Varoquaux	 &	 Thirion,	 2014).	 Such	 a	 face-validity	
criterion	 of	 meaningful	 model	 fit	 is	 all	 the	 more	 important	 because	 of	 the	 general	 trade-off	 in	
statistics	 between	 choosing	 models	 with	 best	 possible	 performance	 and	 those	 with	 model	
parameters	 that	 are	 most	 interpretable	 (T.	 Hastie	 et	 al.,	 2001).	 Instead	 of	 maximizing	 prediction	
scores,	neuroimaging	investigators	might	want	to	focus	on	neurobiologically	informed	feature	spaces	
and	 mechanistically	 interpretable	 model	 weights	 (Brodersen,	 Schofield,	 et	 al.,	 2011;	 Bzdok	 et	 al.,	
2015;	K.	E.	Stephan,	2004).	In	fact,	SL	neuroimaging	studies	would	perhaps	benefit	from	a	metric	for	
neurobiological	plausibilty	as	an	acid	test	during	model	selection.	Reverse-engineering	fitted	models	
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by	reconstruction	of	stimulus	or	task	aspects	(Miyawaki	et	al.,	2008;	Thomas	Naselaris,	Prenger,	Kay,	
Oliver,	&	Gallant,	2009;	Thirion	et	al.,	2006)	could	become	an	important	evaluation	metric	for	why	a	
learned	feature-label	mapping	exihibits	a	certain	model	performance	(Gabrieli	et	al.,	2015).	This	may	
further	 disambiguate	 explanations	 for	 (statistically	 significant)	 better-than-chance	 accuracies	
because	 i)	 numerous,	 largely	 different	 members	 of	 a	 given	 function	 space	 may	 yield	 essentially	
similar	model	performance	and	 ii)	 each	 fitted	model	may	only	 capture	a	part	of	 the	 class-relevant	
structure	 in	 the	 neuroimaging	 data	 (cf.	 Nikolaus	 Kriegeskorte,	 2011).	 For	 instance,	 fit-for-purpose	
metrics	 used	 in	 neuroimaging	 could	 uncover	 what	 neurobiological	 aspects	 allow	 classifying	 an	
individual	 as	 schizophrenic	 versus	 normal	 and	which	neurobiological	 endophenotypes	underlie	 the	
schizophrenia	"spectrum"	(Bzdok	&	Eickhoff,	2015;	Hyman,	2007;	Klaas	E.	Stephan	et	al.,	2015;	K.	E.	
Stephan,	Friston,	&	Frith,	2009).	
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6.	Case	study	one:	Generalization	and	subsequent	classical	inference	
Vignette:	We	 are	 interested	 in	 potential	 differences	 in	 brain	 structure	 that	 are	 associated	with	 an	
individual's	 age	 (continuous	 target	 variable).	 A	 Lasso	 (belongs	 to	 SL	 arsenal)	 is	 computed	 on	 the	
voxel-based	morphometry	data	(Ashburner	&	Friston,	2000)	from	the	brain's	grey	matter	of	the	500-
subject	HCP	release	(Human	Connectome	Project;	Van	Essen	et	al.,	2012).	This	L1-penalized	residual-
sum-of-squares	 regression	 performs	 variable	 selection	 (i.e.,	 effectively	 eliminates	 coefficients	 by	
setting	them	to	zero)	on	all	grey-matter	voxels'	volume	information	in	a	high-dimensional	(not	mass-
univariate)	 regime.	Assessing	generalization	performance	of	different	 sparse	models	using	 five-fold	
cross	validation	yields	the	non-zero	coefficients	for	few	brain	voxels	whose	volumetric	information	is	
most	predictive	of	an	individual's	age.	
Question:	How	can	we	perform	classical	inference	to	known	which	of	the	grey-matter	voxels	selected	
to	be	predictive	for	biological	age	are	statistically	significant?	
	
This	 is	 an	 important	 concern	 because	most	 statistical	methods	 currently	 applied	 to	 large	 datasets	
perform	some	explicit	or	implicit	form	of	variable	selection	(Trevor	Hastie	et	al.,	2015;	Jenatton	et	al.,	
2011;	Jordan	et	al.,	2013).	There	are	even	many	different	forms	of	preliminary	selection	of	variables	
before	performing	significance	tests	on	them.	First,	Lasso	is	a	widely	used	estimator	in	engineering,	
compressive	 sensing,	 various	 "omics"	 branches,	 and	 other	 sciences,	 mostly	 without	 a	 significance	
test.	Beyond	neuroscience,	generalization-approved	statistical	learning	models	are	routinely	solving	a	
diverse	set	of	real-world	challenges.	This	includes	but	is	not	limited	to	algorithmic	trading	in	financial	
markets,	real-time	speech	translation,	SPAM	filtering	for	e-mails,	face	recognition	in	digital	cameras,	
and	 piloting	 self-driving	 cars	 (Jordan	 &	Mitchell,	 2015;	 LeCun	 et	 al.,	 2015).	 In	 all	 these	 examples	
statistical	 learning	 algorithms	 successfully	 generalize	 to	 unseen	 data	 and	 thus	 tackle	 the	 problem	
heuristically	without	classical	significance	test	for	variables	or	model	performance.	
Second,	 the	Lasso	has	solved	the	combinatorial	problem	of	what	subset	of	grey-matter	voxels	best	
predicts	 an	 individual's	 age	 by	automatic	 variable	 selection.	 Computing	 voxel-wise	 p	 values	would	
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recast	 this	 high-dimensional	 pattern-learning	 setting	 into	 a	 mass-univariate	 hypothesis-testing	
problem	 where	 relevance	 would	 be	 computed	 independently	 for	 each	 voxel	 and	 correction	 for	
multiple	comparisons	would	become	necessary.	Yet,	recasting	into	the	mass-univariate	setting	would	
ignore	the	sophisticated	selection	process	that	led	to	the	predictive	model	with	a	reduced	number	of	
variables	 (Wu	 et	 al.,	 2009).	 Put	 differently,	 the	 variable	 selection	 procedure	 is	 itself	 a	 stochastic	
process	 that	 is	 however	 not	 accounted	 for	 by	 the	 theoretical	 guarantees	 of	 classical	 inference	 for	
statistical	significance	(Berk,	Brown,	Buja,	Zhang,	&	Zhao,	2013).	Put	in	yet	another	way,	data-driven	
model	 selection	 is	 corrupting	 hypothesis-driven	 statistical	 inference	 because	 the	 sampling	
distribution	of	the	parameter	estimates	is	altered.	The	important	consequence	is	that	naive	classical	
inference	 expects	 a	 non-adaptive	model	 chosen	 before	 data	 acquisition	 and	 can	 therefore	 not	 be	
used	along	Lasso	in	particular	or	arbitrary	selection	procedures	in	general10.	
Third,	 this	 conflict	 between	 data-guided	model	 selection	 by	 cross-validation	 (SL)	 and	 confirmatory	
classical	inference	(CS)	is	currently	at	the	frontier	of	statistical	development	(Loftus,	2015;	J.	Taylor	&	
Tibshirani,	 2015).	New	methods	 for	 so-called	post-selection	 inference	 (or	 selective	 inference)	 allow	
computing	 p	 values	 for	 a	 set	 of	 features	 that	 have	 previously	 been	 chosen	 to	 be	 meaningful	
predictors	 by	 some	 criterion.	 According	 to	 the	 theory	 of	 CS,	 the	 statistical	model	 is	 to	 be	 chosen	
before	visiting	the	data.	Classical	statistical	tests	and	confidence	 intervals	therefore	become	invalid	
and	 the	 p	 values	 become	 downward-biased	 (Berk	 et	 al.,	 2013).	 Consequently,	 the	 association	
between	a	predictor	and	 the	 target	variable	must	be	even	stronger	 to	certify	on	 the	same	 level	of	
significance.	Selective	inference	for	modern	adaptive	regression	thus	replaces	loose	naive	p	values	by	
more	rigorous	selection-adjusted	p	values.	As	an	ordinary	null	hypothesis	can	hardly	be	adopted	 in	
this	adaptive	 testing	setting,	conceptual	extension	 is	also	prompted	on	the	 level	of	CS	 theory	 itself	
(Trevor	 Hastie	 et	 al.,	 2015).	 Closed-form	 solutions	 to	 adjusted	 inference	 after	 variable	 selection	
already	exist	for	principal	component	analysis	(Choi,	Taylor,	&	Tibshirani,	2014)	and	forward	stepwise	
regression	 (Jonathan	 Taylor,	 Lockhart,	 Tibshirani,	 &	 Tibshirani,	 2014).	 Last	 but	 not	 least,	 a	 simple	
																																								 																				
10	"Once	applied	only	to	the	selected	few,	the	interpretation	of	the	usual	measures	of	uncertainty	do	not	
remain	intact	directly,	unless	properly	adjusted."	(Yoav	Benjamini)	
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alternative	to	formally	account	for	preceeding	model	selection	is	data	splitting	or	sample	splitting	(D.	
R.	Cox,	1975;	Fithian	et	al.,	2014;	Wasserman	&	Roeder,	2009),	which	is	frequent	practice	in	genetics	
(e.g.,	Sladek	et	al.,	2007).	 In	this	procedure,	 the	selection	procedure	 is	computed	on	one	data	split	
and	p	values	are	computed	on	the	remaining	second	data	split.	However,	data	splitting	is	not	always	
possible	and	will	incur	power	losses	and	interpretation	problems.	
	
7.	Case	study	two:	Classical	inference	and	subsequent	generalization	
Vignette:	 We	 are	 interested	 in	 potential	 brain	 structure	 differences	 that	 are	 associated	 with	 an	
individual's	gender	(categorical	target	variable)	in	the	voxel-based	morphometry	data	(Ashburner	&	
Friston,	2000)	of	the	500-subject	HCP	release	(Human	Connectome	Project;	Van	Essen	et	al.,	2012).	
Initially,	 the	 >100,000	 voxels	 per	 brain	 scan	 are	 reduced	 to	 the	most	 important	 10,000	 voxels	 to	
lower	 the	 computational	 cost	 and	 facilitate	 predictive	 model	 estimation.	 To	 this	 end,	 ANOVA	
(univariate	test	for	statistical	significance	belonging	to	CS)	is	first	used	to	obtain	a	ranking	of	the	most	
relevant	 10,000	 features	 from	 the	 grey	matter	 of	 each	 subject.	 This	 selects	 the	 10,000	 out	 of	 the	
original	>100,000	voxel	variables	with	highest	variance	explaining	volume	differences	between	males	
and	females	(i.e.,	the	male-female	class	labels	are	used	in	the	univariate	test).	Second,	support	vector	
machine	 classification	 ("multivariate"	 pattern-learning	 algorithm	 belonging	 to	 SL)	 is	 performed	 by	
training	and	 testing	on	a	 feature	 space	with	 the	10,000	preselected	grey-matter	measurements	 to	
predict	the	gender	from	each	subject's	brain	scan.	
Question:	Is	an	analysis	pipeline	with	univariate	classical	inference	and	subsequent	high-dimensional	
prediction	valid	if	both	steps	rely	on	the	same	target	variables?	
	
The	implications	of	feature	engineering	procedures	applied	before	training	a	learning	algorithm	is	a	
frequent	concern	and	can	have	very	subtle	answers	(I.	Guyon	&	Elisseeff,	2003;	Hanke	et	al.,	2015;	N.	
Kriegeskorte	 et	 al.,	 2009;	 Lemm,	 Blankertz,	 Dickhaus,	 &	 Muller,	 2011).	 In	 most	 applications	 of	
predictive	models	 the	 large	majority	of	brain	voxels	will	be	uninformative	 (Brodersen,	Haiss,	et	al.,	
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2011).	The	described	scenario	of	dimensionality	reduction	by	feature	selection	to	focus	prediction	is	
clearly	 allowed	 under	 the	 condition	 that	 the	 ANOVA	 is	 not	 computed	 on	 the	 entire	 data	 sample.	
Rather,	 the	 voxels	 explaining	 most	 variance	 between	 the	 male	 and	 female	 individuals	 should	 be	
computed	only	on	the	training	set	in	each	cross-validation	fold.	In	the	training	set	and	test	set	of	each	
fold	the	same	identified	candidate	voxels	are	then	regrouped	into	a	feature	space	that	is	fed	into	the	
support	 vector	machine	 algorithm.	 This	 ensures	 an	 identical	 feature	 space	 for	model	 training	 and	
model	 testing	 but	 its	 construction	 only	 depends	 on	 structural	 brain	 scans	 from	 the	 training	 set.	
Generally,	 any	 voxel	 preprocessing	 prior	 to	 model	 training	 is	 authorized	 if	 the	 feature	 space	
construction	 is	not	 influenced	by	properties	of	 the	concealed	 test	 set.	 In	 the	present	 scenario,	 the	
Vapnik-Chervonenkis	 bounds	 of	 the	 cross-validation	 estimator	 are	 therefore	 not	 loosened	 or	
invalidated	 if	 class	 labels	 have	 been	 exploited	 for	 feature	 selection	 or	 depending	 on	whether	 the	
feature	 selection	 procedure	 is	 univariate	 or	 multivariate.	 Put	 differently,	 the	 cross-validation	
procedure	simply	evaluates	the	entire	prediction	process	 including	the	automatized	and	potentially	
nested	 dimensionality	 reduction	 procedure.	 In	 sum,	 in	 a	 SL	 regime,	 using	 class	 information	 during	
feature	preprocessing	for	a	cross-validated	supervised	estimator	is	not	an	instance	of	data-snooping	
(or	peeking)	if	done	exclusively	on	the	training	set	(Abu-Mostafa	et	al.,	2012).	
This	is	an	advantage	of	cross-validation	yielding	out-of-sample	estimates.	In	stark	contrast,	remember	
that	null-hypothesis	testing	yields	in-sample	estimates.	Using	the	class	labels	for	a	variable	selection	
step	 just	 before	 statistical	 hypothesis	 testing	 on	 a	 same	 data	 sample	 would	 invalidate	 the	 null	
hypothesis	 (N.	 Kriegeskorte	 et	 al.,	 2010;	 N.	 Kriegeskorte	 et	 al.,	 2009)	 (cf.	 case	 study	 one).	
Consequently,	 in	 a	 CS	 regime,	 using	 class	 information	 to	 select	 variables	 before	 null-hypothesis	
testing	will	incur	an	instance	of	double-dipping	(or	circular	analysis).	
Regarding	 interpretation	 of	 the	 results,	 the	 classifier	 will	 miss	 some	 brain	 voxels	 that	 only	 carry	
relevant	 information	 when	 considered	 in	 voxel	 ensembles.	 This	 is	 because	 the	 ANOVA	 filter	 kept	
voxels	 that	are	 independently	 relevant	 (Brodersen,	Haiss,	et	al.,	2011).	Univariate	 feature	selection	
may	systematically	encourage	model	selection	(i.e.,	each	weight	combination	equates	with	a	model	
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hypothesis	from	the	classifier's	function	space)	that	are	not	neurobiologically	meaningful.	Concretely,	
in	the	discussed	scenario	the	classifier	 learns	complex	patterns	between	voxels	that	were	chosen	to	
be	 individually	 important.	 This	 may	 considerably	 weaken	 the	 interpretability	 and	 conclusions	 on	
"whole-brain	multivariate	patterns".	Remember	also	that	variables	that	have	a	statistically	significant	
association	with	a	target	variable	do	not	necessarily	have	good	generalization	performance,	and	vice	
versa	 (Lo	et	al.,	2015;	Shmueli,	2010).	On	 the	upside,	 it	 is	widely	believed	 that	 the	combination	of	
whole-brain	 univariate	 feature	 selection	 and	 linear	 classification	 is	 frequently	 among	 the	 best	
approaches	 if	 the	 primary	 goal	 is	 optimized	 prediction	 performance	 as	 opposed	 to	 optimized	
interpretability.	Finally,	it	is	interesting	to	consider	that	ANOVA-mediated	feature	selection	of	p	<	500	
voxel	 variables	 reduces	 the	 "wide"	 neuroimaging	 data	 ("n	 <<	 p"	 setting)	 down	 to	 "long"	
neuroimaging	data	with	fewer	features	than	observations	("n	>	p"	setting)	given	the	n	=	500	subjects	
(Wainwright,	2014).	This	allows	 recasting	 the	SL	 regime	 into	a	CS	 regime	 in	order	 to	 fit	a	 standard	
general	 linear	 model	 and	 perform	 classical	 null-hypothesis	 testing	 instead	 of	 training	 a	 predictive	
classification	algorithm	(Brodersen,	Haiss,	et	al.,	2011).	
	
8.	Case	study	three:	Structure	discovery	by	clustering	algorithms	
Vignette:	Each	functionally	specialized	region	in	the	human	brain	probably	has	a	unique	set	of	long-
range	 connections	 (Passingham,	 Stephan,	&	 Kotter,	 2002).	 This	 notion	 has	 prompted	 connectivity-
based	parcellation	methods	in	neuroimaging	that	segregate	a	region	of	 interest	 (ROI,	can	be	locally	
circumscribed	or	brain	global;	S.	B.	Eickhoff,	Thirion,	Varoquaux,	&	Bzdok,	2015)	into	distinct	cortical	
modules	(Behrens	et	al.,	2003).	The	whole-brain	connectivity	for	each	ROI	voxel	is	computed	and	the	
voxel-wise	 connectional	 fingerprints	 are	 submitted	 to	 a	 clustering	 algorithm	 (i.e.,	 individual	 brain	
voxels	in	the	ROI	are	the	elements	to	group;	the	connectivity	strength	values	are	the	features	of	each	
element	 for	 similarity	 assessment).	 In	 this	 way,	 connectivity-based	 parcellation	 issues	 cortical	
modules	 in	 the	 specified	 ROI	 that	 exhibit	 similar	 connectivity	 patterns	 and	 are,	 thus	 potentially,	
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functionally	 distinct.	 That	 is,	 voxels	 within	 the	 same	 cluster	 in	 the	 ROI	 will	 have	 more	 similar	
connectivity	properties	than	voxels	from	different	ROI	clusters.	
Question:	Is	it	possible	to	decide	whether	the	obtained	brain	clusters	are	statistically	significant?	
	
Essentially,	the	aim	of	connectivity-guided	brain	parcellation	is	to	find	useful,	simplified	structure	by	
imposing	discrete	compartments	on	brain	topography	(Frackowiak	&	Markram,	2015;	S.	M.	Smith	et	
al.,	 2013;	 Yeo	 et	 al.,	 2011).	 This	 is	 typically	 achieved	 by	 k-means,	 hierarchical,	 Ward,	 or	 spectral	
clustering	algorithms	(Thirion,	Varoquaux,	Dohmatob,	&	Poline,	2014).	Putting	on	the	CS	hat,	a	ROI	
clustering	 result	 would	 be	 deemed	 statistically	 significant	 if	 it	 has	 a	 very	 low	 probability	 of	 being	
"true"	 under	 the	 null	 hypothesis	 that	 the	 investigator	 seeks	 to	 reject	 (Everitt,	 1979;	 Halkidi,	
Batistakis,	&	Vazirgiannis,	2001).	Choosing	a	test	statistic	for	clustering	solutions	to	obtain	p	values	is	
difficult	(Vogelstein	et	al.,	2014)	because	of	the	need	for	a	meaningful	null	hypothesis	to	test	against	
(Jain,	Murty,	&	Flynn,	1999).	Put	differently,	for	hypothesis-driven	statistical	inference	one	may	need	
to	pick	an	arbitrary	hypothesis	to	falsify.	It	follows	that	the	CS	notions	of	effect	size	and	power	do	not	
seem	to	apply	 in	 the	case	of	brain	parcellation.	 Instead	of	 classical	 inference	 to	 formally	 test	 for	a	
particular	 structure	 in	 the	 clustering	 results,	we	 actually	 need	 to	 resort	 to	 exploratory	 approaches	
that	discover	and	assess	structure	in	the	neuroimaging	data	(Efron	&	Tibshirani,	1991;	T.	Hastie	et	al.,	
2001;	Tukey,	1962).	Although	statistical	methods	span	a	continuum	between	the	two	poles	of	CS	and	
SL,	finding	a	clustering	model	with	the	highest	fit	in	the	sense	of	explaining	the	regional	connectivity	
differences	at	hand	is	more	naturally	situated	in	the	SL	community.	
Putting	on	the	SL	hat,	we	realize	that	the	problem	of	brain	parcellation	constitutes	an	unsupervised	
learning	setting	without	any	 target	variable	y	 to	predict	 (e.g.,	 cognitive	 tasks,	 the	age	or	gender	of	
the	 participants).	 The	 learning	 task	 is	 therefore	 not	 to	 estimate	 a	 supervised	predictive	model	 y	 =	
f(X),	 but	 to	 estimate	 an	 unsupervised	 descriptive	 model	 for	 the	 connectivity	 data	 X	 themselves.	
Solving	such	unsupervised	estimation	problems	is	generally	recognized	to	be	very	hard	(Bishop,	2006;	
Zoubin	Ghahramani,	 2004;	 T.	 Hastie	 et	 al.,	 2001).	 In	 clustering	 problems,	 there	 are	many	 possible	
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transformations,	 projections,	 and	 compressions	 of	 X	 but	 there	 is	 no	 criterion	 of	 optimality	 that	
clearly	suggests	itself.	On	the	one	hand,	the	"true"	shape	of	clusters	is	unknown	for	most	real-world	
clustering	 problems,	 including	 brain	 parcellation	 studies.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 finding	 an	 "optimal"	
number	 of	 clusters	 represents	 an	unresolved	 issue	 (cluster	 validity	 problem)	 in	 statistics	 in	 general	
and	 in	brain	neuroimaging	 in	particular	 (Handl,	Knowles,	&	Kell,	2005;	 Jain	et	al.,	1999).	Evaluating	
the	model	fit	of	clustering	results	is	conventionally	addressed	by	heuristic	cluster	validity	criteria	(S.	
B.	Eickhoff	et	al.,	2015;	Thirion	et	al.,	2014).	These	are	necessary	because	clustering	algorithms	will	
always	find	subregions	in	the	investigator's	ROI,	that	is,	relevant	structure	according	to	the	clustering	
algorithm's	optimization	objective,	whether	 these	 truly	exist	 in	nature	or	not.	 There	 is	 a	 variety	of	
such	 criteria	 based	 on	 information	 theory,	 topology,	 and	 consistency.	 They	 commonly	 encourage	
cluster	 solutions	 with	 low	 within-cluster	 and	 high	 between-cluster	 differences,	 regardless	 of	 the	
applied	clustering	algorithm.	
Evidently,	 the	 discovered	 connectivity	 clusters	 are	 mere	 hints	 to	 candidate	 brain	 modules.	 Their	
"existence"	in	neurobiology	requires	further	scrutiny	(S.	B.	Eickhoff	et	al.,	2015;	Thirion	et	al.,	2014).	
Nevertheless,	 such	 clustering	 solutions	 are	 an	 important	means	 to	 narrow	down	high-dimensional	
neuroimaging	data.	Preliminary	clustering	results	broaden	the	space	of	research	hypotheses	that	the	
investigator	can	articulate.	For	instance,	unexpected	discovery	of	a	candidate	brain	region	(cf.	Mars	
et	 al.,	 2012;	 zu	 Eulenburg,	 Caspers,	 Roski,	 &	 Eickhoff,	 2012)	 can	 provide	 an	 argument	 for	 future	
experimental	 investigations.	 Brain	 parcellation	 can	 thus	 be	 viewed	 as	 an	 exploratory	 unsupervised	
method	outlining	relevant	structure	in	neuroimaging	data	that	can	subsequently	be	formally	tested	
as	 a	 concrete	 hypothesis	 in	 neuroimaging	 studies	 whose	 interpretations	 are	 based	 on	 classical	
inference.	
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9.	Conclusion	
A	novel	scientific	fact	about	the	brain	is	only	valid	in	the	context	of	the	complexity	restrictions	that	
have	been	imposed	on	the	studied	phenomenon	during	the	investigation	(Box,	1976).	The	statistical	
arsenal	 of	 the	 imaging	 neuroscientist	 can	 be	 divided	 into	 classical	 inference	 by	 hypothesis	
falsification	and	increasingly	used	generalization	inference	by	extrapolating	complex	patterns.	While	
null-hypothesis	 testing	 has	 been	 dominating	 the	 academic	 milieu	 for	 several	 decades,	 statistical	
learning	methods	are	prevalent	 in	many	data-intense	branches	of	 industry	(Vanderplas,	2013).	This	
sociological	segregation	may	partly	explain	existing	confusion	about	their	mutual	relationship.	Based	
on	 diverging	 historical	 trajectories	 and	 theoretical	 foundations,	 both	 statistical	 cultures	 aim	 at	
extracting	new	knowledge	from	data	using	mathematical	models	(Friston	et	al.,	2008;	Jordan	et	al.,	
2013).	 However,	 an	 observed	 effect	 with	 a	 statistically	 significant	 p	 value	 does	 not	 necessarily	
generalize	to	future	data	samples.	Conversely,	an	effect	with	successful	out-of-sample	generalization	
is	not	necessarily	statistically	significant.	The	distributional	properties	of	an	effect	important	for	high	
statistical	 significance	 and	 for	 successful	 generalization	 are	 not	 identical	 (Lo	 et	 al.,	 2015).	
Additionally,	 classical	 inference	 is	 a	 judgment	 about	 an	 entire	 data	 sample,	 whereas	 predictive	
inference	 can	 be	 applied	 to	 single	 datapoints.	 The	 goal	 and	 permissible	 conclusions	 of	 a	 formal	
inference	therefore	are	conditioned	by	the	adopted	statistical	framework	(Feyerabend,	1975).	This	is	
routinely	 exploited	 in	 drug	 development	 cycles	 with	 predictive	 inference	 for	 the	 early	 discovery	
phase	and	classical	inference	for	the	clinical	trials	phase.	A	similar	back	and	forth	between	applying	
inductive	learning	algorithms	and	deductive	hypothesis	testing	of	the	discovered	candidate	structure	
could	and	should	also	become	routine	in	imaging	neuroscience.	Awareness	of	the	discussed	cultural	
gap	is	important	to	keep	pace	with	the	increasing	information	granularity	of	acquired	neuroimaging	
repositories.	Ultimately,	statistical	inference	is	a	heterogenous	concept.	
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